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ABSTRACT
The Evidence and Mechanisms Employed In

Intuitive Hypothesis Testing
(February,

1981)

Daniel Patrick Blyth, B.A., University of Colorado
M.A.

,

University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

Professor leek Ajzen

This paper examines and critiques experimental approaches to the
study of intuitive reasoning.

The insufficiency of earlier attempts to

characterize human judgment via mathematical or probabilistic models was
traced to three sources:

the inability of the probability calculus to

adequately typify causal relationships, the presumption of analytic cue
integration to the exclusion of other (e.g., analogic) processing, and
the failure of mathematical formulations to incorporate the rich store
of archival information an individual brings to any judgment.

The more recent attempts to describe intuitive reasoning in terms
of cognitive heuristics were also examined.

While this approach holds

forth the promise of a more adequate description of the processes

actually used by individuals, its assumption of discrete and taskspecific judgmental strategies will obscure and delay the exploration of
the fundamental principles guiding the way in which information is used

enroute to any decision or inference.

iii

Both the probabilistic and the heuristic models
of judgment

identified several errors in intuitive reasoning.

he
lave

One of these is the

"confirmatory error"— the tendency to use predominately
confirming
evidence in evaluating the plausibility of

a

hypothesis.

An experi-

mental study was conducted to better determine the source of
this error.
Is it due to memory or interpretive errors?

Does the hypothesis enhance

the retrievability of confirming evidence while masking or
suppressing
the recall of disconf irming data?

Or is the interpretation of retrieved

evidence altered such that more data comes to be viewed as supportive of
the hypothesis?

The obtained results suggest that both the retrieval and

the interpretation of evidence is affected by the hypothesis, and these

effects are to some extent dependent upon the instructions or orientation

brought to the judgmental context.

If individuals are asked to review

the information they consider relevant, there is a tendency to focus

more on confirming than disconf irming evidence.

It is suggested that

this tendency arises because the instructions encourage the use of a

comparison-to-prototype decision strategy, and the prototype is weighted
in favor of the hypothesis.

Under more critical instructions when the

decision maker is prompted to first review all available evidence about
the issue, and then to evaluate each bit of that evidence for its

implications for the hypothesis, the confirmatory error is less likely
to occur.

The findings also suggest that under either orientation there

is a tendency to interpret ambiguous or ambivalent evidence as supportive.

iv

The paper concludes with the challenge to investigators of social

cognition to resolve an apparent paradox:

The experimental literature

has shown intuitive reasoning processes to be seriously and pervasively
flawed, yet the impression of reality is that individuals, and the

species, reason appropriately

— they

generally manage their daily affairs

well, avoiding harm to themselves and others, they learn from their

mistakes, and they adapt their decisions accordingly in light of past

experience.

One of the two impressions is misleading.

Either the

optimistic view of reality is yet another example of cognitive errors
or the pessimistic impression created by the literature is overstated.

v
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CHAPTER

I

PREDICTIVE MODELS OF JUDGMENT
Social judgment, in its broadest sense, is concerned
with the way
in which people develop beliefs, make inferences,
generate predictions,

and evaluate conclusions about other people or events.

Defined this

globally, the field has a long history of research and includes
such

diverse areas as attribution theory, models of decision-making, and

interpersonal judgment.

Although wide-ranging in terms of the

particular judgments and contexts examined, these different content
domains share a common objective, the accurate description of
intuitive reasoning.

An obvious difficulty is that researchers cannot observe the
reasoning process per se.

The way in which a decision is made can

only be inferred from the decision itself.

Under this constraint

much of the initial research on social judgment adopted the procedure
of comparing informal or intuitive judgments against those which

would be prescribed by normative or statistical models of information
usage.

Normative models, based on statistical and probability

theory, are an attractive standard of comparison because they

represent "rational" inferential strategies, rational in the sense
that the informational parameters obey certain rules, and the entire

Judgments are based solely upon avail-

process is information-bound.

able information and they are therefore unaffected by "irrational"
factors such as the arbitrary prejudices or desires of the particular

judge making the decision.

In addition to their freedom from
1
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motivational biases, rational decisions are similarly
unencumbered
by cognitive failings.

They are not, for example, victimized by

inefficient organization in memory nor by memory losses.

A great many comparison-to-normative studies have been
conducted,
but the obtained results are conflicting.

Peterson and Beach (1967)

reviewed over one hundred such studies and concluded that "normative

models provide a good first approximation for a psychological theory
of inference.

Inferences made by subjects are influenced by

appropriate variables in appropriate directions" (pp. 42-43).

Slovic

and Lichtenstein (1971) conducted a similar review and came to a

similar conclusion.

Linear statistical models were found to account

for most of the variance in subjective inferences.

researchers, however, share these conclusions.

Not all

Simon (1957) decided

that people have a limited capacity for rational (i.e., normative)

thinking and operate instead on a principle of "bounded rationality."
This bounded rationality "is not even approximately optimal" (p. 198).

Slovic (1972) reviewed more than twenty-five studies of subjective

decision-making and concluded that intuitive processes "show large
and consistent biases" (p. 41).

Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichenstein

(1976) found that people "systematically violate the principles of

rational decision-making when judging probabilities, making
predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic
tasks" (p. 169).

Hammond (1974) examined decisions made about social

policy and came to the pessimistic conclusion that "man's cognitive

capacities are not adequate for the tasks which confront him"

(p.

4).
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Irrational Reasoning or Unequivalent Information

These different conclusions create the impression that sometimes
people reason rationally and sometimes they don't.

This need not

suggest, however, that intuitive judgmental strategies are

capriciously invoked, that people choose to obey statistical rules

when they feel like it and avoid them when, for arbitrary reasons,
they do not.

Comparison-to-normative studies do not illuminate what

people actually do with information.

For the most part, they can

only show whether or not the intuitive scientist has reached the

normative solution.

When discrepancies between intuitive and

statistical judgments occur, the researcher cannot know, in most cases,

whether the discrepancy arose because the individual used different
information enroute to the decision or because he or she employed an

inappropriate decision rule.
often been overlooked.

Unfortunately, this distinction has

For the most part, such discrepancies have

been cited as evidence of irrational processes when the alternative

explanation is more likely.

Another look at the literature suggests

that as statistical models include more of the information subjects

perceive to be relevant to their decisions, they more accurately
predict subjective judgments.
Consider, first of all, the studies which show an agreement

between statistical and intuitive judgments.

In the main,

this

concordance in judgment has been found when the stimuli involved have
been non-social (e.g., bundles of sticks, poker chips, flashing
lights, etc.).

On the other hand, disagreements between the

"statistical man" and the "intuitive
scientist" tend to be more common
and most pronounced when the stimulus
materials portray events with

which the subject already has some familiarity
(e.g., people's
personalities, naturally occurring event sequences,
and so on).

When

the statistical man and the intuitive
scientist begin with the same

prior information— that is no prior information—
their decisions are
in greater agreement.

However, when the intuitive judge brings to

the experimental session some assumptions and
beliefs about the class
of events portrayed in the stimulus materials, and
when those

assumptions are not shared by the statistical man, their
judgments
diverge.
In the typical procedure in normative studies of judgment
the

experimenter constructs stimulus materials to vary certain parameters.
This manipulation allows the researcher to calculate the statistically

optimal use of the information provided.

From the experimenter's

point of view, the final decision is a function of the information
he or she provides to the subjects.

However, the subjects themselves

are not similarly constrained solely to whatever information is made

available during the experiment.
provide a good example.

The "illusory correlation" studies

Chapman and Chapman (1967) paired Rorschach

percepts (responses) with two statements of the clinical symptoms of
the purported patient who was alleged to have made the response.

Subjects were shown thirty such pairs, each representing a different
patient.

After viewing all thirty pairs, subjects were given a

symptom and asked to recall the most prevalent Rorschach percept by

5

patients with that symptom.

The normatively correct procedure for

estimation of covariance consists of computing a
correlation
coefficient based on equal attention to both diagonals
in the

contingency matrix.

2

x

2

In this experiment (Experiment 2), the stimulus

materials were prepared in such a way that no correlation
actually
existed between percepts and symptoms.

While the relationship was not

actually present in the experimental materials, it was consistent
with
people's typical assumptions (as measured with pretest subjects) about
the correlation between certain symptoms and particular traits.

Subjects' estimates of the correlation in the stimulus materials were
thus strongly affected by their previous beliefs about what they

believed to be true in the general population, regardless of what was
said to be true during this one experimental session.

Kenny (1976) reported very similar findings.

Berman and

Inferences about the

personality characteristics of a fictitious person were found to be
substantially influenced by the assumed covariances of those
characteristics in people at large, independent of their correlation
in a sample of stimulus materials.

This reliance on prior beliefs

rather than only upon the empirical relationships displayed in

contrived experimental information has been replicated in a variety of
contexts (cf. Ajzen, 1977; Einhorn
1965;

Snyder

&

&

Hogarth, 1978; Jenkins

Uranowitz, 1978; Smedslund, 1963; Ward

&

&

Ward,

Jenkins, 1965;

Wason, 1960, 1968, 1969).
In numerous other examples, biases or errors were attributed to

subjects when the experimental results do not necessarily support

.

b

that view.

In a recent series of investigations, Ross
and his

colleagues have examined the persistence of intuitive
beliefs.

Of

particular interest was the continued reliance on those
beliefs when
the evidence presented argued against their validity.

Although a

variety of experimental settings, tasks, and methods for
discrediting
evidence have been employed, the basic procedure in all these studies
has been fairly consistent.

Subjects receive false feedback after each trial in a novel discrimination, judgment, or performance task.
of subjects'

After this manipulation

impressions of their abilities, the experimenter

"discredits" the evidence upon which the impression was based.

Dis-

crediting consists of a debriefing session in which the subject
learns that the feedback was totally arbitrary and unrelated to his
or her actual performance.

Other discrediting procedures have

included providing subjects with an alternative explanation of their
performance.

For example, in a "logical problem solving task"

discrediting was accomplished by informing subjects that good or poor
teaching methods, rather than their own abilities
their success or failure (Lau, Lepper,

&

,

were

Ross, 1976).

the cause of

Following this

discrediting session in which they acknowledge their understanding
of the experimental deception, subjects are asked to predict their

performance on similar tasks in the future.

The consistent finding

is that the false feedback "perseveres" and continues to strongly

influence subjects' predictions despite its extensive and acknowledged

discrediting
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These results, that predictions about performance in
the future
are consistent with knowledge about prior performance,
can be

explained without assuming an unwarranted reliance on invalidated
beliefs.

Since subjects' use of a priori understandings was not

directly assessed, it is not certain that such understandings were
actually invoked.

It is possible that subjects (or at least some of

them) had no idea of the reasons for their success or failure in these

novel tasks.

In estimating their performance on subsequent tasks,

they may have adopted the reasonable strategy which prescribes that
the best predictor of future ability is past ability.

Although the

evidence about their ability was questioned, it could, especially in
the absence of any other predictive base,

continue to serve as the

best estimate of their subsequent performance.
In more recent work, Ross and his associates have extended this

research to examine more directly the survival of intuitive beliefs
or theories themselves.

In one experiment, theories were provided

for subjects (Anderson & Ross,

1978).

At the beginning of the

experimental session subjects were led to believe that a relationship
existed between a personality characteristic (riskiness) and

performance (success or failure as a fireman)

.

After informing

subjects of the "theory," concrete examples ostensibly confirming the
theory were presented.

As in the previous studies, subjects were

then debriefed, i.e., they were told that the experimenter had made
up both the theory and the examples.

Following this debriefing

session, subjects were asked to predict personality traits (riskiness)

8

on the basis of performance information—
a test of their continued

reliance on discredited theories.

The results indicated that subjects

continued to believe that the initially
presented theory characterized

the true functional relationship.

Their predictions were in accordance

with the fictitious theory.
In another experiment reported by Anderson and Ross
(1978), sub-

jects were not provided with an a priori theory, but were
instead

given information about the personalities and performances of
two
persons and were asked to discover the relationship between traits and
performance.

After the functional relationship had been discovered,

the debriefing procedures were employed.

Again,

the theories

survived the debriefing sessions and were used as the basis for subsequent predictions.

These results are said to demonstrate that once a theory is

accepted as a plausible explanation for the observed relationship

between antecedents and consequents, it survives the erosion or discrediting of its evidential base.

Whether the theory was provided by

the experimenter or induced by subjects themselves, it continued to

influence their predictions even after the theory and its supporting
data were acknowledged to have been fabricated by the researcher.
However, this finding reflects an unwarranted use of disconfirmed
theories only if the theories have no other support than that provided,
and discredited, during the experiment.

9

Consider, for example, a subject who is told that he or
she has

been successful in discriminating between genuine and bogus
suicide
notes (Ross, Lepper,

&

Hubbard, 1975).

Since no "theory" explaining

the causes of such successful discrimination was provided,
the subject
is free to call upon his or her own beliefs.

To explain this apparent

success the subject can invoke a generalized theory of performance in
any task, reasoning, perhaps, that success arises from a combination
of sufficient innate ability and practice.

The subject then searches

for evidence attesting to his or her possession of these causal

properties.

(One subject attributed his success to his prior reading

of the works of a suicidal author

— evidence,

perhaps, of practice.)

This theory explaining success stands as a generalized rule.

accounted for success or failure in countless previous tasks.
is no reason to suppose,

It has

There

and indeed it would be irrational if, this

validated theory were abandoned in the face of the single experimental
instance in which it may or may not have been confirmed.
the evidence was questioned, but it was not denied.

In this study,

Despite the fact

that after debriefing the subject is unsure of his or her actual

performance, the theory relating ability and/or practice to performance
is still valid, as is the historical evidence for his or her possession

of the causal factors indicated by the theory.

In the second series of experiments by Ross and Anderson, the

experimenter provided the theory.

For some subjects, riskiness was

said to be positively related to a fireman's performance.
the converse was said to be true.

In either case,

For others,

the subjects found

10

riskiness to be a plausible cause of either
success or failure.

Anderson and Ross report that subjects in both
conditions were able to
explain why riskiness was related to competence
in a fireman.
Riskiness is a plausible cause of competence because
examples of instances in which its presence or absence co-varied
with success or
failure are available in memory.
by historical evidence.

Both theories are thus supportable

Even though the experimenter said he con-

cocted it himself, subjects were able to support the theory
with

remembered instances.
as a predictor.

They could therefore continue to use the theory

It is easy to imagine that quite different findings

would have been obtained if the theory provided by the experimenter
were implausible, i.e., if it were not supportable by evidence
obtained outside the experimental session.

If,

for instance,

the

theory had suggested a functional relationship between hair color and

fire-fighting ability, the perseverance effect would probably not
occur.

Such a theory would be quickly abandoned after debriefing.

Ross et al suggest that their research demonstrates "the

survival of theories in the absence of evidence" (Anderson

&

Ross, 1978).

That is true only if evidence is limited to that presented in

experimental sessions.

As in many of the studies cited previously,

it denies the evidence subjects bring with them to the experiment.

Studies of this kind make it clear that individual shave and use
a rich store of historical knowledge to guide their inferences and

decisions.

They do not base their judgments solely on whatever

information is currently available, but freely and confidently draw
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upon their stored understandings of similar
people and events.

As long

as statistical models do not take into account
historical knowledge,

discrepancies between intuitive and normative judgments
are to be
expected.

A principal source of such discrepancies can thus
be

traced to differences in information and not to fallacious
or irrational

reasoning on the part of the intuitive decision-maker.

Peterson and

Beach (1967) recognized this point after their review:

"If the

statistical man were to incorporate subjects' assumptions, his
inferences would be more descriptive of those made by subjects"

(p.

43).

Prior beliefs and assumptions can be included in statistical

decision-making.

Bayesian models, for example, specify the way in

which new information should be reconciled with existing or prior
information.

The latter is represented in Bayes

prior probability or expected value.

'

theorem as the

A large number of studies have

shown that the inclusion of prior information decreases the dis-

crepancy between normative and subjective judgments.

Although in-

dividuals often tend to be conservative in their probability revisions,
Bayes'

theorem has been shown to be a reasonably good predictive

model of many judgments, including trait inferences (Peterson,
Ulehla, Miller, Bourne,

&

Stilson, 1965), impression formation

(Cohen, 1973), interpersonal relations (McNeel & Messick, 1970), and

attribution processes (Ajzen, 1971).
However, Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973) have found that people
do not judge in a manner consistent with normative principles even

when prior odds are included in the normative model.

On the basis

of a series of experiments they concluded that people "do not appear

L2

to follow the calculus of chance or the
statistical theory of

prediction" (1973,

p.

237) and that "man is not a conservative

Bayesian; he is not a Bayesian at all" (1972,

p.

450).

In one experiment, subjects were given brief
descriptions of five

people.

One description, for example, described Jack as a 45
year

old man with a wife and four children.

Jack was said to be con-

servative, careful, ambitious, with no interest in politics or social
affairs, and was said to spend his free time on carpentry, sailing,
and mathematical puzzles.

Prior odds were manipulated by varying

the sample size from which the descriptions were drawn.

Subjects in

one condition were told that the sketch was randomly chosen from

summaries prepared by a panel of psychologists who interviewed 30

engineers and 70 lawyers.

Subjects in the other base rate condition

read that the psychologists had interviewed 70 engineers and 30
lawyers.

After presentation of this information, subjects were asked

to judge whether Jack was an engineer or a lawyer.

Kahneman and

Tversky found that subjects in both conditions decided that Jack was
more likely to be an engineer.

The Bayesian procedure prescribes

that the decision should be a function of two factors:
i.e.,

the prior odds,

the prior probability that any person in the sample is a lawyer

or an engineer, and the probability that the description provided

fits a lawyer or an engineer.

given by the sample sizes.

probability was 70/30.

In this case, the prior odds were

In the high-engineer condition,

the prior

Conversely, in the low-engineer (or high-

lawyer) condition, the prior odds were 30/70.

Given the marked

difference in prior probabilities, subjects in the high-engineer

13

group should predict that Jack is more likely
to be an engineer,

while the other subjects should be similarly
influenced by their
prior odds and judge that Jack is a lawyer.
In another demonstration, Tversky and Kahneman
(1974)

told their

subjects about a certain town having both a large and
a small
hospital.

Forty-five babies are born each day in the larger hospital

and fifteen in the smaller.

When asked which hospital recorded more

days on which more than 60% of the babies born were male, most

subjects confidently answered that there was no difference, that
each hospital would have recorded an equal number of such days.

According to sampling theory, the smaller hopsital should have been
chosen.

Because the number of births is less in the smaller

hospital, the variance in the ratio of boys and girls will, most
likely, be higher.

The chances are therefore greater that the smaller

hospital recorded more days during which the number of boys was

significantly greater than the number of girls.

The subjects in

this experiment, however, did not let this consideration influence

their predictions.

Judgments

by subjects in both of these problems reflect a

lack of attention to base rates.

In the engineer example, the

optimally correct judgment is determined, in part, by the respective
sample sizes.

Similarly, in the second example, the choice of

hospitals is, normatively, dependent upon the sample size.
of these and similar studies (Bar-Hillel,

Lyon

&

Results

1975; Hammerton, 1973;

Slovic, 1976; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Nisbett, Borgida,

Crandall,

&

Reed,

1976) have been interpreted as evidencing a bias

14

in intuitive reasoning, a bias in that relevant
information about

the statistical parameter is not weighted by the size
of the sample

from which the parameter was derived.

However, it is not the case that people simply do not attend
to sample sizes or base rates.

Tversky and Kahneman (1973) did find

that the effect of the manipulation of base rates was significant in

their study; it was, however, overshadowed by the specific information

about Jack.

They also found that when no other information about the

person is provided, prior probabilities guide subjects' judgments.
Also, Bar-Hillel (1975) found that inferences and predictions are

appropriately influenced by base rates when those base rates are
extreme.

Some recent research on this issue has helped explain why

prior probabilities and base rates are relatively ignored in some
cases and appropriately relied upon in others.

Ajzen (1977) asked his subjects to assess the likelihood that an
hypothetical student had passed a final exam.

A brief description of

the student was provided, as was base rate information.

Two

different forms of the base rate information were used.

Some sub-

jects were told that the hypothetical student was a member of a class
in which 75% of the students passed (or, in another condition, failed)
the exam.

Subjects in the other base rate group read that a

psychologist chose to interview a sample of which 75% had passed (or
failed), and that the hypothetical student was a member of the chosen
sample.

Clearly, the base rates in the first condition imply something

about the difficulty of the exam, a factor causally relevant in an

estimate of the likelihood of any student's success
on the exam.

The

second base rates carry no such causal implications;
they merely

summarize the interviewing preferences of the psychologist.

Ajzen's

data indicated that subjects in both conditions took into
account
the base rates provided, but causal base rates much more
strongly

influenced subjects' predictions.

Note that the Bayesian solution to

this problem would be the same in both base rate conditions

— the

numerical values of these prior probabilities are identical.
However, it is their connotative implications, and, more accurately,
their causal implications that render them more or less relevant to
the judgment.

If base rates provide causally relevant information,

they appropriately influence inferences.

If,

on the other hand,

they merely summarize the frequency distribution of non-causal

variables, they are given little or no weight in subjective decisionmaking.

Base rates in the form of distributional frequencies impart

no causal information.

They serve only to express highly generalized

expectancies about any member of the sample selected at random.

In

these experimental examples, and indeed in most inferential tasks,

people are required to make predictions about particular individuals
or events, not about any person or event of a certain kind taken at

random.
If subjects in Tversky and Kahneman's studies had been asked the

same question about people's occupations or about other pairs of

hospitals, and if they continued ignoring base frequencies and

sample sizes, they would, in the long run, err more often than they

were correct.

However, it may not be fair to condemn subjective

.
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reasoning as fallacious simply because it
would render erroneous
results in the long run.

It may be better to evaluate
subjective

decisions on logical grounds rather than on
purely statistical
grounds.

Subjects in Tversky and Kahneman's studies
followed a

logically reasonable course; they invoked their
intuitive beliefs to
assess whether any of Jack's or the hospitals'
characteristics were
of the kind known to them to cause (or co-vary
with)

outcomes

the suggested

^

Modelling Causal Reasoning

The studies conducted by Ajzen show that not all information is

equally relevant in subjective judgments.

Although sample sizes

may be critically important to the statistical man, they are usually
less important to the intuitive scientist.

Ajzen 's results point to

the predominant role of causality in human reasoning.

People think in

causal terms, and this has been unambiguously documented in varied
contexts.

Michotte (1963) has shown that individuals tend to perceive

causality merely from the observation of temporarily contiguous
events.

Piagetian theory (Piaget, 1972; Piaget

&

Inhelder, 1969) holds

that understandings about causality are an inherent part of and con-

comitant with the process of cognitive development.

Numerous learning

studies have documented that people rarely see events as randomly

determined (cf. Peterson
Jenkins, 1965).

&

Beach, 1967; Smedslund, 1963; Ward

&

Because events in their day-to-day lives are the

product of identifiable causes, people do not regard chance as a
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suitable explanation for events in experimental
settings.

Subjects

believe that patterns are present in experimental
materials and that
the underlying regularities can be discovered,
often despite the

researchers instructions to the contrary.
jects are correct.

(In many cases,

the sub-

Jones and Myers (1966) have shown that sequence
:es

experimentally randomized in short block are often not truly
randc
lom
at all and that subjects can outguess the experimenter.

Myers, 1966, for a review.)

See

Heider (1958, Kelley (1967, 1973), and

other attribution theorists (cf. Jones

&

Davis, 1965) have demonstrated

the prevalance and impact of causal reasoning in person perception
(see Janoff-Bulman's review, 1977).

Ajzen's (1977) data and results

of similar studies by Tversky and Kahneman (in press) show that people

look for and prefer causal antecedents even when they are, from a

statistical point of view, no more diagnostic than other information.
In addition to the tendency to prefer causal evidence upon which to

base a prediction about the future, people prefer causal explanations
for events that have already occurred, even when other reasons (e.g.,

sampling variability, regression to the mean) are available as
sufficient alternative explanations.

Normative statistical models, however, cannot accomodate this
fundamental feature of human reasoning, largely because they do not
define the temporal ordering of events.

In a recent paper, Tversky

and Kahneman (in press) describe a set of experiments originally

conducted by Turoff (1972).

Subjects were asked to estimate the likeli-

hood of one event in light of another event.

The information provided to

subjects in one study was the following (as summarized by Tversky

:
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and Kahneman)

Let C be the event that within the next five
years
Congress will have passed a law to curb mercury
pollution.
Let D be the event that within the next five years the
number of deaths attributed to mercury poisoning will
exceed 500. Let C and D indicate the negations of C and D,
respectively.

After presentation of this information, subjects were asked to estimate
which member of two pairs of conditional probabilities was most likely:
1.

p

(C/D)

or

p

(C/D)

or

p

(D/C)

and
2.

p

(D/C)

Most subjects estimated that Congress is more likely to restrict mercury

pollution if the death toll rises than if it does not.

The majority

of subjects also judged that the death toll is less likely to rise if
the law is enacted than if it is not.
1.

p

(C/D)

>

p

(C/D)

p

(D/C)

That is, subjects estimated:

and
2.

p

(D/C)

<

While these are intuitively reasonable judgments, they violate the

normative statistical conventions.
Event sequences can be linked statistically only through conditional probability statements.

The normative judgment in this problem,

given by the rules of conditional probability, is that
>

p

(C/D)

then p (D/C)

<

p

if p

(C/D)

(D/C)

(as subjects in this experiment estimated)

)
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This discrepancy between intuitive and statistically optimal

judgments arises because conditional probabilities are temporarily
ambivalent; neither event is assumed to precede or cause the
other.

Subjective decisions, however, routinely make assumptions about the
temporal order and causal relationships between events.

The differ-

ence between normative and informal estimates in judgments of this

kind does not reflect irrationality or even bounded rationality on
the part of subjects.

The subjective decision can be shown to

obey logical and probabilistic rules if the probability calculus is

expanded to include the temporal order of events.

Suppes (1970) has

suggested one way to describe causal relationships in probabilistic
terms.

His work does not constitute a full probabilistic theory

of causality, and given the prevalence of causal reasoning in human

judgment, much more work is needed.

Nevertheless, even the formative

bases of such a theory provide a better description of intuitive
causal reasoning than that afforded by conditional probability statements.
2

Given two events, C and D, D is the cause of
p

,/D

(C
t

)

>

t

p

(D

P

(C

,/C
t

C if:

)

t

and,
P

,/D

(C

)

>

t

t

,/D
t

)

>

t

t

where,
t <

t'

and,
P

(D

)

>

0

(t

precedes

t

,/D

(C

p

'

)

t
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If the first two statements are assumed to
be true, as they apparently

were, and reasonably so, by subjects in Turoff's
study, they imply
p

(D/C)

<

p

(D/C)

which is the judgment Turoff's subjects rendered.
to the rules of conditional probability,

Although contrary

it is logically correct.

fallacy here does not rest with subjects' reasoning, but with
the
attempt to model that reasoning via an inappropriate statistical
formula.

The

CHAPTER

II

DESCRIPTIVE MODELS OF JUDGMENT
The inability of the probability calculus to accomodate
causal

principles, given that causality plays such a central role in human
reasoning, represents a serious limitation of the adequacy of statistical models of the inference process.

Furthermore, even when statis-

tical models are shown to be predictive of intuitive judgments, there
is no suggestion that statistical reasoning bears any resemblance to the

actual processes people employ in their decisions.

Recent research on

social judgment has turned away from statistical models as analogues
and has aimed toward a more descriptively accurate explanation of

intuitive reasoning.

Most current research has acknowledged the

importance of previously stored information
individuals have accumulated over time

— and

— the

knowledge that

recognizes that they do

not, neither in their daily lives nor in experimental tasks, judge

each new instance as if it were wholly independent from any other

previous experience.

People bring with them remembered examples of

similar instances and evaluate new occurrences in light of previous
ones.

Any descriptive theory of judgment should provide an explanation

of how people invoke their stored knowledge enroute to inferences

about the particular people or events at hand.

This explanation would

necessarily include assumptions about the way in which information
about prior instances is represented in memory, and about how that

information is accessed and used.

21

22

Cognitive Heuristics

In the series of articles cited above, Kahneman and Tversky
(1972, 1973: Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) proposed that people have

developed a limited number of judgmental "heuristics".

These

heuristics are described in terms of cognitive rules-of-thumb, shortcut methods of using stored beliefs to infer or predict something

about new people or events.

According to Kahneman and Tversky,

people use different heuristics in different judgmental tasks.
The "representativeness" heuristic, for example, is said to be
used in determining whether or not a particular instance is an

example or a member of a superordinate category.

In judgments of this

kind, people consider the extent to which the essential features of
the new instance are representative of or similar to the defining

characteristics of the category.

To return to the lawyer/engineer

example, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) suggest that subjects inferred

Jack's occupation by comparing his attributes to those of the most
typical or most representative lawyers and engineers.

Because

Jack's traits and preferences were more like those of the stereotypical engineer, subjects assigned him to that category.
of
The "availability" heuristic is said to guide judgments

frequency or probability.

Judgments of the likelihood of occurrence

can be recalled
are based on the ease with which similar occurrences

from memory.

ects
In one demonstration of this heuristic, subj

often in the first or
were asked whether the letter K appeared more
third position of English words.

Because words beginning with K are

.
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mo re easily retrieved from memory than words
which have a K as the
third letter, subjects guessed, erroneously, that
K is more likely
to appear in the first position (Tversky &
Kahneman,

1973).

The "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic is said to be employed
in judgments of numerical values when some initial value
is made

available and salient.

For example, subjects in one experiment were

initially given a randomly generated number.

They were then asked

to indicate whether the random number was higher or lower than the

number of African nations in the United Nations.

Finally, subjects

were asked to estimate the actual number of African members in the
United Nations.

Despite the fact that the initial value was known to

be arbitrarily drawn,

it markedly affected subjects'

final estimates.

When the random number was high, subjective estimates of African
members were high.

When the initial value was low, subjects'

guesses were correspondingly lower.

It appeared that subjects

followed a strategy of adjusting their estimates from the initial

anchoring value, even though that anchor was clearly irrelevant to the

question (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)
Tversky and Kahneman'

s

work on heuristics is an important step in

the development of a theory of intuitive reasoning.

However, there are

some troublesome aspects of a conceptual framework which posits dis-

crete and disconnected judgmental strategies.

Particularly problematic

is the assumption of task-specific judgmental processes.

This implies

that there may be as many discrete heuristics as there are types of

decisions, with the attendant implication that

a

theory of subjective
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judgment would consist of little more than a
catalogue of qualitatively
distinct tasks, each with its matching heuristic.

Secondly, even

within a single type of task, different heuristics
can compete as
explanations of the processes employed.

For example, perhaps subjects

judged Jack to be an engineer, via the representativeness
heuristic,
by assessing the similarities between his characteristics and
those of
the stereotypical engineer.

But couldn't the same judgment be ex-

plained in terms of the availability heuristic by assuming that
examples of engineers who possessed characteristics like Jack's were

more available in memory than examples of lawyers who possess Jack's
traits?

The Theory of Lay Epistemology

Kruglanski and his colleagues have offered an alternative frame-

work by which to analyze and understand intuitive reasoning.
theory of lay epistemology (Kruglanski, Hamel, Maides,
1978; Kruglanski & Ajzen, Note

1)

&

The

Schwartz,

views the process as a sequential

series of steps by which an individual uses both historical knowledge
and current information to generate inferences and make judgments

about a particular person, entity or event.

This theory assumes that

there exists a single fundamental judgmental process, one that is

relatively invariant across different tasks and that is stable
regardless of the kind of knowledge relevant to the question at hand.
Individuals are likened to scientists in their pursuit of answers to
their questions.

According to the theory, the course of the "epistemic

episode" leading to any inference or judgment involves the following

.

stages
I.

Problem Initiation
In everyday affairs, questions requiring a
decision or judg-

ment emerge from or are initiated by the individual's
experiences.

In

psychological experiments, the problems are posed by the researcher.
II.

Problem Formulation
Whether self-generated or asked by someone else, the question,

once formed, leads to the generation of potential answers or hypotheses.

Like their scientific counterparts, intuitive hypotheses represent the

alternative plausible answers to the particular question.

To borrow

Kruglanski and Ajzen's example, a person may want to know why his car
failed to start on a cold morning.

The hypotheses consist of those

factors known or assumed to be associated with the normal functioning
of his engine

— the

battery, ignition, etc.

The number of hypotheses

generated is determined by the knowledge and creativity of the intuitive scientist.

Someone who is totally ignorant about automobiles

would be hard pressed to generate many hypotheses to explain why his
car isn't working.

On the other hand, a trained mechanic would be

able to list a variety of potential causes of the engine's failure.
In other contexts,

someone else.

the rival hypotheses may be provided by

In experiments, for example, the researcher may pose

the initial question and may accompany it with several potential

answers

.
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III.

Problem Resolution
During this stage in the epistemic sequence, the individual

evaluates the relative plausibility of the competing hypotheses by

considering whether they are consistent or inconsistent with all the
available evidence.

Consistent evidence increases the individual's

confidence in a hypothesis and inconsistent evidence weakens that
confidence
IV.

Termination
It is possible,

in principle,

to have an indefinite number of

alternative hypotheses for any given question.
testing could, then, proceed indefinitely.

Intuitive hypothesis-

However, the epistemic

sequence is, in practice, bounded by several factors.

The intuitive

scientist comes to accept one hypothesis and to reject the remainder
on the basis of the importance of the question, his or her tolerance
of ambiguity,

the relative strength of support of one hypothesis over

others, plus a variety of motivational influences.

Testing Hypotheses:

The Evidence Used

Perhaps the majority of the research on social judgment has been
concerned with the problem resolution phase of the epistemic sequence,
the stage during which the intuitive scientist tests the plausibility
of rival hypotheses.

In order to assess those hypotheses the in-

dividual draws from his or her total store of knowledge that subset

which would constitute evidence for or against them.

According to

Kruglanski et al, evidence is that knowledge or that set of beliefs

that is relevant to the proposition under consideration.

that relevance can be defined as material implication.

They propose

More formally,

some belief X is relevant to some hypothesis H
IFF

{

X

)

H

}

or

{

H

)

X

}

or

{

X

)

H

}

It is not clear that the concept of psychological relevance should
be

made equivalent to the proposition of material equivalence as it is
defined in the calculus of formal logic.

However, this definition is

sufficient to impart the reasonable assumption that two occurrences are
relevant if they co-vary and/or share common properties.

Knowledge of

the traits and preferences of lawyers is relevant to the hypothesis

that Jack is a lawyer while the size of the group from which he came
is not because the former has co-varied with occupational standing

but the latter has not.

The "if and only if" condition of the definition serves to circum-

scribe the boundaries of relevant knowledge.

However, within those

boundaries a wide range of beliefs are potentially relevant and could
be used to evaluate the strength of one or more hypotheses.

Evidence

relevant to the hypothesis that Jack is a lawyer could include (in

addition to whatever is known about Jack) the traits of a single known
lawyer, the traits of several lawyers, and/or those of a stereo-

typical lawyer.

Each meets the criterion of evidential relevance

and each could be used as the comparative base against which to judge

Jack's characteristics.
ferent judgments.

In most cases, each would yield quite dif-

Kruglanski's relevance definition does not aid in

predicting which type of evidence would be recalled from memory in any
judgmental task, nor is there

a

consensus in other theoretical views
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of the judgmental process.

Although both specific examples and

stereotypical representations are assumed to be
available in memory,
theories differ in suggesting which would be
used as evidence.
In the cognitive literature considerable
attention has been

devoted to explaining how individuals judge whether
a given instance
or case belongs in one category or another.

In the terminology of

lay epistemology, this is an evaluation of the hypothesis
that a

particular person, object or event is a member of a certain group
of
like persons, objects or events.

One school of thought holds that

this decision is made by comparing the particular case not against

some known member of the category but against a cognitive summary
of the distinctive characteristics of the category.

It is assumed

that, as a function of experience with multiple exemplars of a group,

people abstract its defining features and generate a prototype which

embodies those definitive aspects.

There is little consensus as to

how a prototype should be precisely defined, but is is clear that it
represents the central tendency of the category.

For groups identified

by qualitative attributes (i.e., groups which are defined by color,
form, etc.),

the prototype consists of the modal values along those

attributes.

When the exemplars of

a

category assume values on

quantitative dimensions, the prototype represents the mean or average
value on those dimensions.

Differential salience or importance of

attributes is accomodated by a weighting parameter.

Thus,

the

prototype exists as some sort of mathematical combination of the

attributes of component exemplars, averaged over all exemplars in
the category.

According to prototype models, people recognize and

classify new cases by comparing them to the stored
prototype.
Most of the research on prototypes has employed
non-social stimuli
(dot patterns, geometric forms, etc.) and considerable
support for

this family of models exists in the cognitive literature
(cf.

Bransford & Franks, 1971; Franks
1968)

.

&

Bransford,

1971; Posner & Keele,

Prototypes have also been introduced as an explanatory con-

cept in social judgments as well.

Tversky and Kahneman's representa-

tiveness heuristic is, essentially, a judgment by prototype model.
Likewise, Abelson's (Abelson, 1976; Langer

&

Abelson, 1972; Schank

&

Abelson, 1977) "scripts" are assumed to be cognitive representations
of the diagnostic features of types of social event sequences.

More

recently, two investigations have examined the utility of the prototype model as an explanation of social categorization.

Cantor and

Mischell (1977) and Tsujimoto (1978) explored how people use stored
information to make decisions about other people's traits.

In both

studies, results appeared to support a comparison-to-prototype

explanation.

An alternative interpretation of the way in which people use

acquired information to make decisions about new instances is provided
by the "feature" family of models.

They differ from prototypes in

that they assume that much more information about exemplars, such as

their component features, is used during judgmental tasks.

In

prototype models, the component dimensions are assumed to be
independent, and the prototype is aggregated over all exemplars.
Thus, the individual category members themselves play no role in

determining the classification of new cases.

Feature models challenge
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this assumption with the argument that such
judgments are based on the

retrieval of information about the features of
specific exemplars.
Included within the family of feature models are the
"proximity"

model (Reed, 1972), the "context theory of classification"
(Medin
Schaffer, 1978), and the "property set" model (Hayes-Roth
1977).

&

&

Hayes-Roth,

Note, too, that Tversky and Kahneman's availability heuristic

proposes that many judgments are based on the retrieval of specific
examples that are similar to the instance under consideration.

Brooks

(1978) also suggests that, under certain learning and task conditions,

people reason by comparing the specific case at hand against its most
similar exemplar and not against a stereotypical representation of the
entire category of similar events.
In short, there are several, and often competing, views of the

evidence people recall in testing their intuitive hypotheses.

The

use of one type over another is surely dictated by several factors,

perhaps the most important of which is the variability of the

hypothesized class of people or events.

In homogeneous groups with

exemplars which differ little from one another, a prototype will
suffice as an accurate and economical summary of the characteristics

defining group membership.

However, for "ill-defined" categories

composed of multiple exemplars which vary widely, the prototype can
only embody the more abstract commonalities.

As the prototype

becomes more abstract it is a less adequate representation of any
single exemplar, it is less adequate as

a

summarization of the entire

category, and it is less useful as comparative evidence in making

predictions about any new instance.

In other words, while both

,
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prototypes and memory for specific exemplars may be relevant
as
evidence in testing hypotheses, their degree of relevance
is limited
by the variability of the categories to which they refer.

Evidence

can be ordered in terms of its relevance by adding another term
in

Kruglanski's definition of relevance which substitutes "to the extent
that" for "if and only if."

This additional statement provides for

a ranking of different evidence in terms of their probative values.

Testing Hypotheses:

The Process Used

Having gathered the relevant evidence, the task of the intuitive
scientist is to test the competing hypotheses in light of the assembled
The way in which this testing proceeds is not well

evidence.

It is often proposed,

articulated.

for example,

that individuals

assess the "match" between the evidence and the current instance or
that they "compare" its evidentiary features with those of the

problematic case.

The actual mechanisms involved in "matching" or

"comparing" are not clearly defined.

In the theory of lay epistemology

it is proposed that people accept or reject hypotheses by applying the

"principle of consistency," by considering whether the evidence
relevant to

a

hypothesis is consistent with that hypothesis.

Unfortunately, the consistency principle is not developed within the
theory.

It stands as a general rule and is defined as equivalent to

logical consistency:

Evidence and a hypothesis are consistent to the

extent that they mutually imply each other.
trate this concept is the following.

An example used to illus-

The hypothesis that John is

his homework
a good student would be held on the evidence that he does
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because doing homework is consistent with being a
good student.
Clearly, empirical research is needed to lend more
precision to the

principle of psychological consistency.

At best,

the consistency rule

refers to a generalized mode of problem resolution.

A handful of

theoretical positions have been proposed as more definite
explanations
of the comparison process.

These models may be viewed as types or

components of judgments of consistency.
Both prototype and feature models assume that people compare the

characteristics of the new case against those of the hypothesized
category by computing a metric distance between the two.
to these models,

According

the attributes of the new instance and those of the

recalled instance (either a prototype or a specific exemplar) can be
thought of as occupying some psychological space.

In assessing the

similarities between the two entities, the individual is said to
calculate their psychological distance, and this distance is a measure
of their congruence.

In prototype models,

the recognition of new

instances is proposed to be a function of their distance from prototype.

In feature models,

the distance of the new case from the

exemplar is assumed to determine the classification judgment.

Tversky (1977) has offered a non-metric model of the way in

which people assess similarity.

According to his contrast model,

similarity between entities is a function of the ratio of common to

non-common attributes.
Brooks (1978) has proposed that in many tasks, individuals adopt
an "analogical" rather than an analytical strategy of comparison.

33

However, he has not specified exactly how that analogical
judgment

might be made.

CHAPTER

III

ERRORS AND BIASES IN INTUITIVE HYPOTHESIS-TESTING

The theory of lay epistemology

,

as well as a great many other

approaches, likens the naive problem-solver to an intuitive scientist-

generating hypotheses and then assessing the strength of their
evidential support.

While both the goals and the process may be

fundamentally the same for the intuitive and the formal scientist,
vast differences exist in their problem-solving methods.

In teasing

out the effects of hypothesized causal factors, or in controlling

extraneous effects, the researcher can hold some variables constant

while manipulating others.
measure of control.

The intuitive scientist has no such

He or she must disentangle the effects of causal

factors sheerly by cognitive activity alone, by trying to figure out

what the results of such disentanglement might have been.

This dis-

tinction is a difference between active experimentation and "passive

cognition" (Hammond, 1978).

Furthermore, the research scientist can

suspend a judgment to accept or reject an hypothesis until empirical
evidence, collected under relatively pristine conditions, is

assembled.

The intuitive scientist must usually make his or her

decision much more quickly and his or her evidence typically consists
not of a newly acquired set of unbiased data, but rather of what he o
she can remember.

Thus,

since his or her evidence is retrieved from

memory, the intuitive scientist's hypothesis-testing is vulnerable to
all the factors known to influence memory storage and recall.
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evidence is often incomplete, it may have been
originally acquired in
haste, or incidentally, and it will erode
over time.

Under all these

disadvantages, judgmental errors are bound to occur.
In most of the social judgment literature,
"bias" and "error"

have been used interchangeably to refer to any source
which intrudes

upon the subjective inference process and yields a
judgment discrepant
from the normative solution.

Kruglanski and Ajzen (Note

1)

argue that

it is useful to preserve a distinction between the two
terms.

Here,

bias refers to a tendency to prefer, on arbitrary grounds, one
hypothesis over another.

Errors, on the other hand, occur when information

is unwittingly used incorrectly,

i.e., when the subjective weight

attached to some evidence does not conform to its "objective" weight.

3

Biases arise from the motivations of the decision-maker and reflect
his or her wishes or desires.

Errors are traceable to the information

used enroute to the decision.

According to this distinction, biases

are the result of a deliberate and active selection of preferred

evidence; errors are the result of unintentional flaws in the storage
or recall of relevant evidence.

Biases and errors can occur at any stage of the epistemic
sequence.

"Wishful thinking," for example, may lead one to prefer

one potential hypothesis over other alternatives and to seek its

supporting evidence while ignoring information supportive of the

unattractive hypotheses.

In instances such as this,

the intuitive

judge has both self-serving and discrediting evidence available, but
chooses to select, or attach unwarranted weight to, that evidence which
tends to confirm the desired hypothesis.

In their paper, Kruglanski
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and Ajzen discuss this and other
motivational biases and their
intrusion
into the reasoning process.
(See also Beckman, 1970; Freize
& Weiner,
1971; Heider,

1958; Johnson, Feigenbaum, & Weiby,
1964; Jones

&

Davis,

1965; Kelley, 1967; Miller & Ross, 1975; and
Ross, 1977 for other

discussions of motivated biases, particularly
as they occur in

attributional judgments.)

According to the present interpretation,
cognitive errors occur
because of the information used in testing hypotheses.

For any given

hypothesis, a wide variety of evidence is potentially
available in
memory.

However, not all that information is accessed during the

epistemic process.

Retrieval is influenced by factors which increase

the "availability" of some information,

factors such as salience,

primacy, recency, and so on (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).

While

these may be unintentional constraints on the retrieval of evidence,
their effects nevertheless produce inaccurate judgments.
In addition to these factors which are known to influence the

accessibility of stored information, there may be other unintentional
intrusions into the epistemic process.

In some recent research,

Snyder and his colleagues have proposed the idea that the hypothesis
itself may create subtle criteria for the selection of relevant

evidence.

The basic premise is that formulated hypotheses tend to be

tested by a "confirmatory strategy."

Rather than attending to both

supportive and non-supportive evidence, people tend to assess the

plausibility of

a

hypothesis by selectively retrieving and attending

to more evidence which confirms it.

This tendency is not assumed to

be motivated by the desires of the individual (it has been shown to
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occur even when subjects are given incentives
to be accurate), but is

considered to be an unintentional error in intuitive
hypothesis-testing.
In one study in this research program subjects
were led to believe

that they would conduct interviews with other students
(Snyder

Swann, 1978).

&

Subjects were told that their task was to use the

interviews to gather information to test

a

hypothesis.

Some subjects

were asked to find out if the interviewee was an extravert.

Other

subjects were to assess if the interviewee was an introvert.

After

presentation of the respective hypotheses, subjects were given

a

profile describing the traits, preferences, and behaviors of typical

extraverts (or introverts), and a list of potential questions that
could be asked of the interviewee to test the given hypothesis.

Some

suggested questions were ones that would, according to the judgment
of pre-test subjects, be asked of people known to be extraverts, some

would be asked of known introverts, and some were neutral.

From these

potential questions subjects were asked to select 12 which would
enable them to link the interviewee's characteristics to those described in the profile.
The results showed that subjects chose to ask questions that

solicited hypothesis-confirming evidence about twice as often as they
chose questions that solicited disconf irming evidence.

Subjects in

the extravert condition tended to select questions characteristically

asked of persons already known to be extraverts, while subjects in the

introvert condition preferred questions typically asked of known
introverts.

Although the disconf irming evidence should be important

in any decision to accept or reject the stated hypothesis,

subjects
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overwhelmingly favored the confirmatory evidence.
The tendency to adopt this confirmatory strategy was replicated

under several conditions in several experiments.

It occurred when the

origin of the hypothesis was varied, i.e., whether it was
indicated by
the results of a valid personality test or simply
emerged from an in-

formal character sketch (Snyder

& Swann,

1978, Experiment 1).

The

confirmatory strategy was also unaffected by the likelihood of the
hypothesis, where likelihood was manipulated by base rates (Experiment
3),

and was similarly unaffected by substantial incentives for judg-

mental accuracy (Experiment 4).

Furthermore, even when subjects were

testing hypotheses about themselves, they tended to choose confirmatory

evidence even when the hypothesis was not necessarily flattering
(Snyder

&

Skrypnek, Note

2)

.

The only condition under which the effect

was not obtained was when no hypothesis was presented.

In the absence

of either personality profile, subjects were more likely to select

questions from both the Introvert and Extravert domain (Snyder

&

Swann,

Note 3).
While these investigations appear to offer fairly convincing
support for the pervasive confirmatory error in intuitive hypothesistesting, certain of the procedures used undermine the validity of the

findings.

Specifically, the instructions to subjects may have provided

strong demand characteristics.

Recall that they were asked to choose

questions that would enable them to link the characteristics of the

interviewee with those in the profile of the typical extravert (or
introvert).

Under these instructions, subjects may have interpreted
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their task not as one of unbiased hypothesis-testing,
but rather as

one of matching the profiled characteristics with those
of the
interviewee.

If the task were seen as such,

it would be reasonable to

select those questions for which a match could be obtained, i.e.,

questions which would provide confirming evidence.
In another series of experiments, the confirmatory strategy was

further explored.

In this series (Snyder & Cantor, 1979), two

important changes were made.

cedures were employed.

First, different instructions and pro-

Secondly, subjects tested the hypothesis by

retrieving evidence from memory rather than by gathering new evidence
once the hypothesis was presented.

Snyder and Cantor prepared a four page narrative about one week
in the life of a woman named Jane.

The account was structured to

include examples of Jane behaving in an extraverted fashion as well as

instances in which she acted in an introverted manner.
of this account, pretest subjects judged Jane

verted and moderately introverted.)

to

be both

(On the basis

moderately extra-

In the first experimental session,

subjects read the narrative and answered 20 questions about specific

factual details of the story.

In the second session, conducted two

days later, subjects were randomly assigned to either the Extravert
or Introvert hypothesis condition.

Subjects in the former were asked

to judge how well-suited Jane was for the job of real estate sales-

person.

Those in the Introvert condition were to assess Jane's

suitability for the position of research librarian.

All subjects

were given a profile of the ideal person for the respective positions.

.
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The extravert profile indicated that the ideal real
estate salesperson was outgoing, talkative, bold, and so on.

The ideal librarian

was described as reserved, quiet, studious, soft-spoken
and discrete.
Before making their judgments of job suitability, subjects
were

asked to write down all the facts from the story they considered
to be

relevant to assessing Jane's qualifications for the job in question.
Finally, subjects were to rate, on a six-point scale, how well-suited

Jane was for the hypothesized position.
The results of the first experiment in this series showed no

difference in judgments of job suitability between the Extravert and
Introvert conditions.

However, subjects in both conditions tended to

report hypothesis-confirming evidence as relevant more often than

disconf irming evidence.

In a second study,

the idealized profile was

omitted and subjects were free to use their own notions of the best
real estate salesperson or the ideal research librarian.

Another

dependent measure was also added in this second experiment.

After

deciding Jane's suitability for the hypothesized position, subjects
were asked to judge her suitability for the other job as well.

Under

these conditions, Snyder and Cantor found that subjects rated Jane
as more suitable for the hypothesized job than for the other position,

even though the story about Jane provided equal evidence for both

hypotheses
Before proceeding to the explanations proffered for these

obtained effects, the distinction between this and some similar

research should be made clear.

Several studies have investigated the

.
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influence of "ancillary" information on the recall and
interpretat:
:ion
of previously-learned information.

Snyder and Uranowitz (1978), for

example, presented subjects with a case history of a woman
called
Betty.

Later, and depending upon the experimental condition
to which

they were assigned, subjects were told that she had pursued
either a

lesbian or a heterosexual life style.

Subjects were then given a test

of their recall of the initial case history (which was, according to

pretest subjects, equally supportive of either kind of life style).
Snyder and Uranowitz found that when subjects erred in recall, their
errors were in the direction of the labelling accomplished via the

ancillary information.

That is, subjects who were later told that

Betty was a lesbian misremembered that her life's events were con-

sistent with stereotypical beliefs about that life style.

Subjects in

the heterosexual labelling condition also misremembered what they

had originally read about Betty such that they recalled her life's

events in a manner consistent with typical assumptions about heterosexual women.
In a similar study, Spiro's (1977) subjects read about an engaged

couple.

The man was said to be opposed to having children and, after

discussing this with his fiancee

finds that she enthusiastically

agrees (or, for some subjects, unequivocally disagrees) with him.

In

the ancillary information presented later, subjects learn either that

the couple eventually were married or that they broke off their

engagement
When subjects in this experiment were tested for their memory of
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the first passage, Spiro found that they
consistently erred by dis-

counting or forgetting facts that were inconsistent
with the final
outcomes and over-emphasizing those that were
consistent with the

knowledge they later acquired.

For example, subjects who were original-

ly told that the financee vehemently disagreed about
having children

and later learned that the couple proceeded to get married
forgot that
the fiancee disagreed, or remembered that she was only mildly
opposed
to her husband's opinion.

Both these studies evidence the reconstructive facility of
memory.

Information is not simply stored as it is presented, but is

actively interpreted and changed by other information.

Subjects in

these experiments reconstructed their initial knowledge to make it

consistent with the information they later obtained.

The difference

between this work and that of Snyder and Cantor is that in the former,
the ancillary information was presented as a factual outcome.

Despite what they had learned in the original passage, subjects came
to know that the woman was either a lesbian or a heterosexual.

wise, Spiro

's

Like-

subjects knew that regardless of their agreement or

disagreement on the issue of children, the couple eventually either got

married or broke up.

In Snyder and Cantor's studies,

information is not a factual bit of knowledge.

the ancillary

It is simply a

hypothesis or a possibility that must be evaluated in light of their

previously-stored knowledge.

When later information is presented

as fact, there is apparently a substantial tendency to reconcile it

with previous beliefs, to make

a

coherent whole out of all related
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knowledge, regardless of apparent
discrepancies in parts of that
knowledge.

However, when the subsequent proposition
is stated not as

a fact but as a possibility,

there should be no such tendency.

Snyder

and Cantor's results, however, appear to
show that the same kind of

errors are made.
Snyder and Cantor suggest that their findings
point to a funda-

mental feature of intuitive reasoning.

In testing hypotheses about

other people, individuals tend to adopt the confirmatory
strategy,
asking, in effect, "What do I know about this person that
would enable

me to support my hypothesis?" rather than asking, "What do

would enable me to confirm or disconfirm my hypothesis?"

I

know that

This

strategy produces an error in that it tends to increase the likelihood
that the hypothesis will be accepted when, as in these studies, both

supportive and contradictory evidence is potentially available.
Snyder and Cantor point out that this tendency may arise as a
result of either of two mechanisms.
the retrieval of stored evidence.

First, the error may occur during

The statement of the hypothesis it-

self may induce the selective recall of stored instances or facts
that support it.

This selective recall could occur if memory is

organized in terms of superordinate conceptual categories, and, under
them,

their defining exemplars.

Given such a cognitive structure,

subjects in these experiments may have ordered Jane's behaviors under
conceptual categories denoting introversion and extraversion as they
read the narrative.

The presentation of the hypothesis activates the

conceptual categories implied by that hypothesis and the task becomes
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one of finding the goodness of fit between Jane's
behaviors and

exemplars ordered under the superordinate conceptual category.
For subjects in the Extravert condition, for instance, the
task is to

match behaviors stored as specific examples of Jane's extraversion
against those stored as generalized exemplars of that superordinate
concept.

Disconfirming evidence is less easily accessed because it

is stored as examples of a different category.

This interpretation

would be consistent with models of memory which view stored information
as a network of hierarchical links and nodes.

According to these

models, memory is interrogated in a sequential fashion, beginning with

higher-order generalities and traversing downward until specific
behaviors or characteristics are located.
of this type,

see Anderson's HAM theory,

"Spreading activation" Model.

(For a discussion of models

1976, and Collins and Loftus'

Hastie and Kumar, 1979, among others,

propose that memory for persons may particularly be organized and
scanned in this manner.)
The confirmatory strategy may be due to an altogether different

mechanism.

Both confirming and disconfirming evidence may be equally

retrievable and recalled in the same way, but greater diagnostic

weight may be attached to the former.

This would represent more of

an active and deliberate strategy on the part of the intuitive scientist
and would reflect the subjective belief that the presence of the

hypothesized traits and characteristics are worth more as evidence than
the presence of alternative traits or characteristics.

In other

words, confirming evidence is not more available than disconfirming
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evidence, but is perceived to be more relevant
in testing hypotheses.

Several of the "illusory correlation" (cf.
Smedslund, 1965) findings
have been interpreted as demonstrating this
subjective belief.

Einhorn

and Hogarth (1978) provide a good discussion of
features of people's

ordinary lives and the way in which they acquire
information which
promote this belief and lead to its unchallenged
persistence.
Snyder and Cantor note that their experiments do not resolve
the

competing interpretations.

Their obtained results may be due to

either "differential retrieval" or "differential relevance."

The

research proposed below is designed to explore the contributions of
these two mechanisms in intuitive hypothesis-testing.

CHAPTER

IV

THE MECHANISMS INVOLVED IN INTUITIVE HYPOTHESIS-TESTINGDIFFERENTIAL RECALL AND DIFFERENTIAL RELEVANCE

This research was designed to gain further knowledge of the

apparent confirmatory error, and the conditions which promote or suppres
its occurrence.

Snyder and his colleagues have shown, in

of related studies,

a

succession

that when they are asked to list what they consider

to be relevant in evaluating a proposition or hypothesis,

individuals

reliably report more confirming than disconf irming evidence.
also some data which suggest

evidence while testing

unjustifiably accept it.

a

There are

that the tendency to favor confirming

hypothesis translates to

a

tendency to

But the evidence for this effect of a

confirmatory strategy on the final judgment is unconvincing.

After

making a decision about one hypothesis, subjects were asked to turn
around and use the same information to test an alternative hypothesis.

Subjects in this experiment (Snyder

&

Cantor, 1979, Experiment

2)

were

much more likely to accept the first than the second of the two
hypotheses.

It is not surprising that after making one considered

judgment, individuals do not then immediately argue against it by

affirming its alternative to be more true.

There is then ample evidence suggesting that the confirmatory
strategy intrudes on intermediate cognitive processes used enroute to

a

final judgment about an hypothesis, but little evidence that it affects
that final judgment itself.

There is also little indication why that
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intrusion occurs.

The suggested mechanisms are that the
hypothes
iSIS

becomes a retrieval cue prompting recall for favorable
evidence, but

providing no such retrieval prompt for disconf irming
evidence.

The

second proposed explanation suggests that the error comes not
primarily

during the retrieval of available information, but during the
evaluation
of that information.

According to this view, recalled evidence is

evaluated in light of the hypothesis such that confirming evidence is
seen as more favorable, disconf irming evidence is viewed as less

inconsistent and (at least some) irrelevant information comes to be
interpreted as supportive of the hypothesis.

The research described

here included dependent measures of both the recall and interpretive

processes to better untangle the source of the confirmatory error.
The experimental design also varied, through different instructions,
the orientation participants brought to the hypothesis-testing situation
to determine under what conditions the confirmatory error is most likely
to occur.

One group of subjects (Uncritical Orientation) participated in a

replication of Snyder and Cantor's (1979) study:

They were to test

one of two opposing hypotheses and, before making their judgments

about it, listed all the evidence they considered relevant.

Under

these instructions, the confirmatory error is most likely to occur.

The single hypothesis can serve as a retrieval cue enhancing the recall
of hypothesis-consistent information while providing no such organizing

schema for disconf irming evidence.

Furthermore, and apart from any

potential effects of the hypothesis on retrieval, members of this group
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were free to evaluate whatever evidence
they recalled in light of
the
hypothesis, interpreting "relevant" as
"confirming" evidence.
Two other groups of participants tested
hypotheses under conditions

designed to lessen the biasing effects of the
hypothesis.

hypothesis was

After the

stated, members of these groups were asked to
list all

the information they could recall, and not
just a subset of "relevant"

knowledge.

Although the hypothesis was still available as

a potential

organizing schema for selective retrieval of favorable
evidence, their
instructions to recall all their pertinent information
prompted
these subjects to retrieve disconf inning evidence that might
not be

organized under the hypothesis schema, as well as any confirming
evidence that is.

These recall instructions should diminish one of the

possible sources of the confirmatory error

— the

potential for the

hypothesis to exclude from recall much of the disconf irming evidence.
The use of a confirmatory strategy in judgment may best be regarded
as another cognitive rule-of-thumb

intuitive hypothesis-testing.

,

a short cut method for quick and

Its presence may,

therefore, be limited

to instances in which individuals give relatively cursory and uncritical

attention to the proposition under consideration.

(If this is the case,

its use would be most expected when the hypothesis deals with subjectively

unimportant people or events.)

In other judgment situations, when

individuals are prompted, either because of the salience of the issue
or because of specific instructions to do so, they may be much more

deliberate in the way they evaluate the pertinent evidence at hand,
and errors in their hypothesis-testing process may then be less frequent
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and less pronounced.

The present study incorporated
these more

critical conditions.

In addition to being prompted
to retrieve all

their available knowledge, participants in
these two groups (Critical

Orientation) were asked to rate each item of
recalled evidence for
its implications for the hypothesis.

The instruction to be deliberate both in recall
and in evaluation
of evidence should diminish, but not necessarily
eliminate, the

tendency to adopt a confirmatory strategy in hypothesis-testing.

If

that strategy is used, members of the two Critical Orientation
groups
may, like those in the Uncritical Orientation group, recall more

confirming than disconf irming evidence.

If there is a tendency to

interpret evidence in light of the hypothesis, that tendency will be

reflected in the relevance ratings these subjects assigned to the items
of evidence they recalled.

Since this study includes measures of

what individuals retrieve from memory and how they interpreted that
evidence, the source of the confirmatory error can be more accurately
determined.
The two Critical Orientation groups differed in the number of hypotheses tested and in the prior probability of those hypotheses.

Members of one group (Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis) tested
one of two contrasting hypotheses (Jane's suitability for either the

Introvert or the Extravert occupation) and that hypothesis carried
one of three levels of prior probability.

The critical mode of

evaluating evidence may be adopted in some cases but not in others.
When the decision to accept, reject or estimate the likelihood of the
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hypothesis has important personal ramifications or when individuals
are, as subjects in this group were, specifically asked to do
so, they

will be more inclined to be systematic in their hypothesis-testing
and
will be less likely to rely on a short cut approach.

Other features

of the hypothesis-testing situation may also promote or suppress
the

tendency to follow a confirmatory strategy.
the hypothesis,

The prior probability of

independent of its current evidential support, would

seem to be a potentially important factor and one which could act on

either the retrieval process or on the evaluation of the evidence.
Recall that Snyder and Swann (1978, Experiment

3)

this variable may influence the process of testing

also suspected that
a

hypothesis.

However, they chose to manipulate likelihood by varying base rates.

Low prior odds were created by informing some subjects that Jane was

a

member of a sorority of which only seven of 30 members were extraverts
(or introverts).

High prior probabilities were created by informing

the remainder of the subjects that 23 of the 30 members of Jane's

sorority were extraverts (or introverts)

.

In preceding

sections it has

been shown that base rates such as these are not equivalent to subjective prior probabilities since they merely summarize the frequency

distributions of people in categories but impart no explanation for
that distribution.

The fact that Snyder and Swann found no effect of

this manipulation is, therefore, not surprising.

In this study a

potentially more effective manipulation was employed.
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Prior odds were varied by telling participants
in this group
(Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis) of the
judgments of others

who had previously informally tested the same hypothesis.

Some learned

that others had judged the hypothesis to be true; other
members of this

group learned that the hypothesis was, in the judgment of
others, more
likely to be false.

For a third group of participants, the hypothesis

carried no prior probability.

They received no information about the

previous judgment of others.
The second of the groups given the Critical Orientation tested

both of the alternative hypotheses.

When two contrasting propositions

are considered simultaneously, evidence which tends to confirm one tends
to disconfirm the other.

If the hypothesis serves as an organizing

schema, the presentation of both alternatives should make available in

memory evidence which supports both hypotheses as well as evidence

which disconfirms both.

The retrieval process should not, therefore,

favor one of the alternatives over the other.

Like those who tested a single hypothesis under the critical
orientation, these subjects who tested both hypotheses were asked to
attempt to recall all the prior information they had learned, and were

instructed to be deliberate in evaluating whatever they recalled,

assigning relevance ratings to each item of evidence.
To summarize the experimental conditions, one group (Uncritical

Orientation) tested either the Introvert or the Extravert hypothesis
and, before doing so, listed that evidence they considered relevant
to their judgment.

No measures of the interpretation of evidence were
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taken from members of this group.

A second group (Critical
Orientation-

Single Hypothesis) also tested one of the two
hypotheses, and that

hypothesis carried either a low prior likelihood,
a high prior likelihood, or no prior probability.

To diminish any tendency to retrieve a

preponderance of confirming evidence, members of this
group were asked
to attempt to recall all their archival knowledge
and to critically

evaluate each bit of that evidence before deciding to accept
or reject
the hypothesis.

The third group of participants (Critical Orientation-

Both Hypotheses) tested both the Introvert and the Extravert
hypotheses.

These participants had no information about the prior likelihood of the

hypotheses they were considering.

Before making their decision about

the hypotheses members of this group were also asked to think back and

recall all the pertinent knowledge they had learned and to critically

evaluate that evidence for its implications for both hypotheses.
With these three groups it is possible to determine more about
the source of the confirmatory strategy.

If it is due to the effects

of the hypothesis on the retrieval of evidence from memory, all partici-

pants will recall more confirming than disconf irming evidence.

However, if the instructions to attempt to recall all available

evidence are effective in making available in memory disconf irming as

well as confirming evidence, those who tested their single hypothesis
under critical orientation should retrieve proportionately more dis-

confirming evidence than those who were not prompted with specific
recall instructions.
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If the confirmatory error operates during the
interpretation of

recalled evidence, the relevance ratings provided by those
in the

Critical Orientation groups will reflect that source of bias.

If

members of these two groups, despite their instructions to be
careful
in evaluating the evidence and despite the fact that the prior
knowledge

offers the same amount of confirming and disconf irming evidence,

interpret most of what they recall as supportive of the hypothesis,
the hypothesis will have been shown to powerfully affect the way in

which information is construed.

Method

Participants

.

One hundred thirty-five male and female undergraduates

enrolled in introductory psychology courses participated, in small
groups, for course credit.

Procedure

.

The present study employed materials and procedures

based on those used by Snyder and Cantor (1979)
two sessions.

.

It was conducted in

During the first, participants were provided with an

archival store of information.

In the second,

they used that informa-

tion to test hypotheses under different conditions.
First Session

.

To provide the prior information, all

participants read an identical account of events in the life of

woman named Jane.

a

Two 'days later they used that information to test

one or two of the complementary hypotheses:

that Jane was well-suited

for a job that required the personal attributes of the prototypic

job
introvert (Research Librarian) or that she was well-suited for a

.
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that required the personal attributes of a
prototypic extravert (Real

Estate Salesperson).

The narrative about Jane provided
considerable

support for either hypothesis:

In different situations and at different

times Jane was as likely to behave an introverted or

fashion.

extraverted

The descriptors of Jane's behavior were formed using trait

terms which, by themselves, were shown by Cantor and Mischell (1977)
to be normatively associated with introversion or extraversion.

The

narrative contained eleven bits of evidence characterizing Jane as an
introvert ("Jane was shy and timid at the supermarket") and nine
instances in which her behavior was decidedly more extraverted ("Jane

remained friendly and outgoing while jogging despite her long day at
work")

Errors in judgment may occur because, in light of the hypothesis,

confirming evidence is seen as more confirming and disconf irming

evidence is seen as less disconf irming

.

This type of error is testable

in the current experimental design by examining the relevance ratings

assigned by participants in the two Critical Orientation groups
(Single and Both Hypotheses) who were asked to rate each item of

evidence for its relevance to the hypothesis.

In addition to this

tendency to interpret the positive and negative evidence in a manner

consistent with the hypothesis, irrelevant evidence may also be
interpreted in light of the hypothesis.

To explore this potentially

biasing effect of the hypothesis, the narrative about Jane was modified
to include ten instances in which her behavior was irrelevant to

either the introvert or extravert hypothesis.

Irrelevant evidence was

55

created using descriptors which were, in Cantor
and Mischell's study,
shown to be unrelated to the introversion-extraversion
dimension
(e.g., "Jane was patient and courteous at work").

After reading the four page narrative

(a copy of

which appears in

Appendix A), all participants completed a brief test of
their recall
of the narrative.

None of the questions in this test concerned
Jane's

personality or job suitability.

The test was included to ensure that

all participants, regardless of the group to which they were
assigned,

had equivalent prior knowledge available when later testing hypotheses

about Jane.

Second Session

.

Two days later all participants were randomly

assigned to test one hypothesis, the contrasting hypothesis, or both
hypotheses, and to do so under one of two instructions.

One group of

30 participants (Uncritical Orientation) took part in essentially a

replication of Snyder and Cantor's second experiment.

They tested

either the Introvert or Extravert hypothesis, but before doing so were
asked to list whatever information they could recall about Jane
that they considered relevant to their judgment.

In this study,

after

these participants listed the relevant evidence, they were given the

opportunity to list any additional information they could retrieve
from memory.

Finally, they were asked to rate Jane's suitability for

the hypothesized job on a six point scale anchored at the extremes

by "not at all suited" and "very well suited."

The second group of 90 participants (Critical Orientation-Single

Hypothesis) also tested one of the two hypotheses, but did so under

instructions to be more critical in their recall and evaluation of the
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evidence.

Their instructions asked them to
first list all the

information they could recall from the
narrative.

After listing that

information they were asked to rate each
bit of evidence for its
implications for the hypothesis.

These relevance ratings ranged

from -3 to +3 with the negative ratings
indicating that the evidence

recalled connoted Jane's unsuitedness for the
hypothesized job, while
the positive ratings connoted her job
suitability.
In addition,

these participants were further randomly
assigned to

one of three levels of the prior probability
manipulation.

In the Low

Prior Probability level, participants learned that,
in the opinion of

Jane's friends, "she might not be good" in the hypothesized
job.

Those

in the High Prior Probability level learned that Jane's
friends

"thought she might be good" at the job under consideration.

A third

level (No Prior Probability) was denied information about the opinion
of Jane's friends.

The final group of 15 participants (Critical Orientation-Both

Hypotheses) tested both the Introvert and Extravert hypotheses.

Their

task was to judge how well-suited Jane was for the position of real-

estate salesperson and how well-suited she would be as a research
librarian.

Note that these instructions did not ask for a relative

judgment of Jane's suitability for one job in comparison to her

suitability for the alternative.

Instead,

they instructed these

participants to give equal and independent attention to both hypotheses.
The order in which the hypotheses were evaluated was counter-balanced

across subjects.
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Before their final judgment of job suitability,
participants in
this group,

like those who tested a single hypothesis
under the

critical orientation, listed all the information they
could recall
from the narrative and rated each part of that evidence
on the six

point relevance scale for its implication for the hypotheses.

Thus,

each item recalled by these subjects carried two relevance ratings:
one for its implications for the Introvert hypothesis and one for

what it implied about the Extravert hypothesis.

CHAPTER

V

RESULTS

Equivalence of the Prior Informati on
The test of factual information was included
at the end of the
first experimental session to ensure that all
participants had equivalent knowledge potentially available during the second
session when they
put that knowledge to use.

An analysis of the number of errors made on

that test showed no differences across the three groups, F =
1.45, p>. 24

Those who tested both hypotheses made, on the average, 4.60 errors.
the two remaining groups,

3.90.

Thus,

In

the average number of errors was 3.86 and

there is no evidence of systematic differences in archival

information in advance of hypothesis-testing.

Manipulation Check:

Ambivalence of the Prior Information

The narrative about Jane was designed to be equivalently supportive
of both the Introvert and Extravert hypotheses.

Analysis of the job

suitability judgments made by subjects who tested both hypotheses
suggests that the narrative was so perceived.

These subjects judged

that, on the basis of the prior information they recalled, Jane was
as suited for the introverted position of research librarian (X = 3.33)

as she was for the more extraverted occupation of real-estate sales-

person (X = 2.87),

_t

=

.94,

_p

>

-
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Three additional analyses were undertaken to further ensure the

ambivalence of the archival information.
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Two independent judges
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counted the number of introvert, extravert, irrelevant and
ambivalent
items of information recalled by participants in this
group, using the
list of trait descriptors provided and tested by Cantor
and Mischell
(1977) as guides.

If the narrative were imbalanced and favored
one

hypothesis over the other, there would be
the over-represented evidence.

a

tendency to recall more of

An examination of the number of

introvert (X = 1.00) and extravert items (X =
1.47) showed that there
was no such differential recall by these subjects,
t

1.10, p

>.25.

The foregoing results pertain to the "objective"
connotation of
the descriptors in the narrative and show that those in the
group who

tested both hypotheses recalled an equal number of items which, by

themselves, are normatively associated with introversion as they
did items normatively associated with extraversion

.

But the subjective

interpretation of these items may change when they are embedded within
a larger body of information.

To examine the way in which the items

were interpreted, the number of items assigned positive relevance
ratings for the two hypotheses was counted.

As expected,

this

analysis revealed that some items which, by themselves, do not distinguish between introversion and extraversion came to be perceived as

supportive of the hypotheses.

Whereas according to the ratings of the

independent judges, subjects listed, on the average, only about two
items which are "objectively" or normatively associated with intro-

version or extraversion, the participants themselves judged that some
seven items were relevant to the introversion/extraversion distinction.
However, the number of pro-hypothesis interpretations did not differ

.
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between the two hypotheses.

These subjects who tested both
hypotheses

interpreted some three items (X = 3.13) as implying
Jane's suitability
for the introverted job and about three (X =
3.53) as connoting her

suitability for the alternative occupation
Thus,

t

=

.51, p

>.60.

the same number of recalled items were
perceived as pro-

viding support for the introvert and the extravert
hypotheses.

A final

comparison was made to ensure that the two hypotheses were
supported
to the same extent.

The positive (pro-hypotheses) relevance ratings

were summed for each of the two hypotheses and compared.

ferences were found.

The sum of the pro-Introvert ratings (X = 10.93)

was the same as the sum of the pro-Extravert ratings (X
1(1,14) = 1.09,

>

_p

No dif-

= 8.20),

.40.

All of these results support the assumption that the prior infor-

mation about Jane was balanced and could confirm either hypothesis;
participants who tested them both recalled the same number of items
which are normatively associated with introversion and extraversion
Furthermore, apart from the objective connotations of the evidence,
the participatns themselves interpreted an equal number of items to
be supportive of the two hypotheses.

Finally, those items which

implied Jane's suitability for one occupation did so to the same extent
as the items which implied her suitability for the alternative occupa-

tion.

In short,

these findings suggest that evidence

favoring both

hypotheses was equally available and both hypotheses were equally
supported by that evidence.
are shown in Table

1.

The means associated with these findings

TABLE

1

AMBIVALENCE OF THE PRIOR INFORMATION

HYPOTHESIS
INTROVERT

EXTRAVEPT

Job suitability judgment

3.33

2.87

Number of recalled items "objectively"
supporting the hypothesis

1.00

1.47

Number of recalled items subjectively
interpreted as supporting the
hypothesis

3.13

3.53

10.93

8.20

Sum of pro-hypothesis relevance
ratings

All judgments were made by subjects who tested both hypotheses.
None of the differences between the two hypotheses is significant.
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It

may be argued that although the hypotheses
were presented

simultaneously, the decision to accept or reject
them was necessarily

made in sequence and that the confirmatory error
could have operated
such that the first hypothesis was favored over
the second (as

happened under somewhat different procedures in Snyder
and Cantor's
(1979) second experiment).

In the present study,

judgments was counter-balanced.

the order of the

This would ensure that, across all

subjects in this group, no systematic differences between the two

hypotheses would emerge.

But it would also mask any order effects of

the two judgments within individual participants.

To make certain

that these participants did not follow a biased procedure which led

them to favor the first over the second hypothesis, the sequence in

which the two judgments were made was analyzed.
obtained.

No order effects were

The first job suitability assessment was equivalent to the

second (X = 3.2 and 3.0), indicating that these subjects were quite
able to independently evaluate the two hypotheses, that they were

not more likely to accept the first at the expense of the second, and
that their judgment of Jane's suitability for one job did not

necessarily imply her unsuitability for the alternative.
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No Effect of the Prior Probability
Manipulation

One interest of this research was the potential
effect of the

hypothesis' prior probability on the processes
employed to test it.
Here, prior likelihoods were varied by telling
subjects in one group

(Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis) of the opinions
of Jane's

friends with respect to her suitability for the hypothesized
occupation.

Some participants (High Prior Probability) were told
that

Jane's friends thought she might be suited, others (Low Prior
Probability) learned that Jane's friends did not think she would be
suited.

Still others (No Prior Probability) were denied any informa-

tion of this kind.

They made their decision about the hypothesis in

the absence of any indication of its prior likelihood.

Apparently, this manipulation of prior odds was insufficient to
affect the hypothesis-testing process.

It had no impact on job-

suitability judgments, on the type of evidence retrieved from memory,
or on the interpretation of that evidence.

Because of the lack of any effects of this manipulation, the

following analyses were pooled over the three levels of prior
probability.

Judgments of Job Suitability

Analysis of the job suitability judgments made by those who tested
one hypothesis revealed an unexpected main effect of the Introvert over
the Extravert hypothesis.

In both the Critical and

Uncritical
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Orientation groups, subjects who evaluated Jane's suitability for
the
Introverted job judged that she was more suitable than did those
who
tested her qualifications for the Extravert job.

However, this finding alone does not suggest that these subjects

followed a flawed strategy of hypothesis-testing.

The presence of a

confirmatory error would only be indicated if they were led to a

conclusion different from that warranted by the normative or objective
strength of the evidence.

The best measure of the "correct"

job-suitability judgment comes from those who tested both hypotheses
and who found both to be equally supported.

If subjects who tested

one hypothesis differed in their judgments from those who had the

benefit of both hypotheses, a confirmatory error would be indicated.

Analyses of variance comparing the job suitability judgments of
those who tested both hypotheses against the same judgment made by

participants in the other two groups who tested either the Introvert or
Extravert hypothesis revealed no main effects nor interactions.
is,

That

participants who tested only one of the hypotheses were not

influenced to more strongly accept it than were those who tested both
hypotheses.

The means are shown in Table

2.

TABLE

2

JOB SUITABILITY JUDGMENTS

HYPOTHESIS
INTROVERT

EXTRAVERT

Critical Orient at ion-Bo th Hypotheses

3.33

2.87

Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis

3.44

2.49

Uncritical Orientation

3.93

2.47
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Effect of the Hypothesis on Information Recalled

The results of the previous analysis of job suitability
judgments
suggest that participants in this study did not fall prey to any

confirmatory error, at least

insofar

as that error is evidenced by a

tendency to unjustifiably accept a stated hypothesis.

The next series

of analyses examined the effect of the hypothesis on the kind of

information they recalled enroute to their final decision about that
hypothesis.

For each of the participants who tested one of the two

hypotheses (i.e., those in the Critical Orientation-Single hypothesis
group and those in the Uncritical Orientation group), the proportions
of objectively confirming and disconf irming evidence recalled were

counted by dividing the number of pro-hypothesis items by the total
number of items recalled.

A

2

(

Introvert-Extravert hypothesis) x

(Critical-Uncritical Orientation) x

2

2

(Conf irming-Disconf irming Evidence)

analysis of variance, with type of evidence as a repeated measures
factor, revealed a marginal interaction between the hypothesis and the
type of evidence reported.

Those, under either orientation, who

tested the Introvert hypothesis recalled more confirming
than disconf irming (X = 18.75%) evidence.

(X = 25%)

However, this tendency was

not replicated for those who tested the Extravert hypothesis.

This

interaction between the direction of the hypothesis and the type of
evidence recalled about it was marginally significant, F(l,116)
2.71, p

<

.10.

=

No significant differences distinguished between the

two Critical and Uncritical Orientation groups.

Regardless of their

proportions
instructions, all subjects recalled essentially the same
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of confirming and disconf irming evidence.

Table

3

summarizes the types

and proportions of evidence recalled by
members of both groups.

The results of this analysis suggest that any
confirmatory error
is not principally due to the biasing effect
of the hypothesis on

retrieval processes.

There did seem to be some selective recall
favor-

ing the Introvert hypothesis, but none favoring the
Extravert hypothesis
(and, in fact,

the opposite trend was more apparent).

Effect of the Hypothesis on the Interpretation of Evidence

An alternative explanation of the mechanism underlying the con-

firmatory error proposes that the hypothesis under consideration colors
the interpretation of whatever evidence is available:

more evidence is

viewed as confirming and less is seen as disconf irming or irrelevant.
In order to determine whether, and to what extent,

this mechanism is

responsible for the apparent confirmatory error, participants in two
of the groups were asked to provide relevance ratings of the items of

evidence they recalled.

Those who tested either a single or both

hypotheses under Critical instructions rated each item recalled for its
implications for the hypothesis.

Positive values were assigned to

items that, in the opinion of the subject, implied Jane's suitability
for the hypothesized job.

unsuitability

,

If they judged the item to indicate Jane's

a negative value was assigned.

Values of zero were

assigned to items recalled that were subjectively void of implications
for the hypothesis.
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TABLE

3

PROPORTIONS OF CONFIRMING AND DISCONFIRMING EVIDENCE RECALLED

Critical OrientationSingle Hypothesis
INTROVERT

EXTRAVERT

Uncritical
Orientation
INTROVERT

EXTRAVERT

Confirming evidence

24%

13%

28%

22%

Disconf irming evidence

18%

30%

21%

18%
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If the interpretation of the evidence
is veridical,

the subjective

connotation of recalled items will be equivalent to
their "objective"
or normative implications for the hypotheses.

In other words,

of the

items of evidence retrieved from memory, those that
are normatively

confirming, disconf irming or irrelevant will be perceived
that way

despite the hypothesis.

The first analysis examined the proportions

of correct interpretations made by these subjects.

If no interpretive

errors were made, all (100%) of the evidence recalled would have been

interpreted correctly.

This was clearly not the case.

Across all

participants in both groups, less than half (46.5%) the items were
correctly interpreted.
An analysis of variance comparing the two groups and the two

hypotheses revealed that more interpretive errors were made in evaluating the Introvert hypothesis than in testing the Extravert
hypothesis, F(l,41)=6.68,

£

<

.05.

When testing the former, only 37.6%

of the items were correctly interpreted, whereas 55.6% of the items

were correctly interpreted when the Extravert hypothesis was being
considered.

The interaction between the number of hypotheses tested

(one or both) and the direction of the hypothesis was marginally

significant, F(l,61) = 3.61, p

<

.10.

Subjects who tested both

hypotheses were about as correct (or as incorrect) in evaluating an
item's relevance for the Introvert hypothesis (41% correct) as they

were in assessing an item's implications for the Extravert hypothesis
(48% correct).

In contrast,

those who tested only the Extravert

hypothesis were correct in their interpretation of the evidence more

.
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often (i.e., on more items, 58%) than were those
who tested only the
Introvert hypothesis (36% correct).
The fact that these subjects did not often
agree with the

normative interpretation of the evidence they recalled
does not in itself demonstrate that their appraisal of the
information was biased by
the hypothesis.

The next analyses examined the kind of errors
made to

uncover the influence of the hypothesis.

If the

confirmatory error lies

in a tendency to interpret evidence in its most favorable
light, i.e.,
as offering support for the hypothesis, three kinds of errors
will

account for most of the discrepancy between the objective and the sub-

jective interpretations of the evidence:

the tendency to view

normatively disconf irming evidence as irrelevant, or even as confirming,
and the tendency to interpret ambiguous or irrelevant information as

supportive
The proportions of items misinterpreted in each of these three

ways were calculated for both groups and are shown in Table

4.

The

most striking feature of these data is the way disconf irming evidence
was evaluated.

Those who tested the Introvert hypothesis (but not

those testing the Extravert hypothesis) interpreted many objectively

extraverted items as irrelevant to the hypothesis.

The main effect

of the direction of the hypothesis was highly significant,
F = 8.65,

p

<

.01.

Even more striking is the proportion of discontinu-

ing items which came to be viewed as supportive of the hypothesis.

Averaged across both groups, those testing the Introvert hypothesis
judged some 65.1% of the extravert items to be consistent with the
Introvert hypothesis.
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TABLE

4

SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RECALLED EVIDENCE

CRITICAL ORIENTATIONBOTH HYPOTHESES
INTROVERT

CRITICAL ORIENTATIONSINGLE HYPOTHESIS

EXTRAVERT

INTROVERT

EXTRAVERT

80%

78%

49%

78%

9%

93%

12%

85%

Irrelevant evidence interpreted as irrelevant

43%

32%

39%

44%

Total correct interpreta3
tions

41%

48%

37%

58%

Irrelevant evidence interpreted as confirming

55%

DJ/o

52%

51%

Disconf irming evidence interpreted as irrelevant

17%

0%

26%

10%

Disconf irming evidence interpreted as confirming

74%

7%

62%

4%

Total confirmatory misinterpretations

55%

45%

46%

36%

CORRECT INTERPRETATIONS

Confirming evidence interpreted as confirming
Disconf irraing evidence interpreted as disconf irming

CONFIRMATORY MISINTERPRETATIONS

a

items recalled.
Expressed as a percentage of the total number of
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The salience of the misinterpretation of

d is con firming evid<
lence

may obscure the fact that this type of error accounts
for relatively
little of the total amount of all confirmatory errors.

While it is

true that over 60% of all extravert items recalled by
those testing
the Introvert hypothesis were misjudged as supportive,
most subjects

recalled few such disconf irming items (refer to Table 3).

Although

misclassification of these items occurred frequently, this type of
error contributed to less than 25% of all confirmatory errors.
5

Table

shows the relative contribution of each type of error to the total

amount of confirmatory errors.

It can be seen that the largest single

source of error comes from the tendency to interpret irrelevant or

ambiguous evidence as favorable to the hypothesis.
in Table 5 also show

The data displayed

more clearly the pattern of misinterpretations

by those testing the two hypotheses.

Subjects evaluating Jane's

suitability for the introvert occupation were more likely to view

negative evidence as supportive while those testing the extravert

hypothesis interpreted more ambiguous information as confirmatory.
Taken together, and across both groups and both hypotheses, some
43% of all items recalled were misinterpreted in favor of the hypo-

thesis, while only 10% were otherwise misjudged.

Cast another way,

the three types of confirmatory errors account for fully 81.8% of all
the discrepancies between the objective and subjective interpretations
of the evidence available in memory.

These results demonstrate the clear influence of the hypothesis on
the interpretation of evidence.

The confirmatory error may also arise
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TABLE

5

CONTRIBUTION OF EACH TYPE OF CONFIRMATORY ERROR
TO THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF CONFIRMATORY ERRORS

CRITICAL ORIENTATIONBOTH HYPOTHESES
INTROVERT EXTRAVERT

CRITICAL ORIENTATIONS INGLE HYPOTHESES
INTROVERT EXTRAVERT

Irrelevant evidence
interpreted as confirming

68%

98%

65%

90%

Disconf irming evidence
interpreted as confirming

26%

2%

25%

3%

Disconf irming evidence
interpreted as irrelevant

6%

0%

10%

7%
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from more subtle effects of the hypothesis on
the assessment of

evidence by altering the subjective weight of items
of evidence.
is,

That

evidence which offers only weak support may come
to be viewed as

substantially confirming and evidence which argues strongly
against the
hypothesis may be perceived as less damaging.

This study cannot

determine the extent to which the diagnositc value of evidence
was
affected by the hypothesis since there is no way to calculate the
true
and unbiased weight of each item of evidence.

However, since members

of the two Critical Orientation groups provided relevance ratings for

each item they recalled, it is possible to check for differences across
the two groups.

This comparison was made by computing, for each member

of these two groups,

the average value assigned to pro-hypothesis items

(those judged to indicate Jane's job suitability).

was computed for anti-hypothesis items.

The same average

There were no differences

distinguishing subjects who tested both hypotheses from those who
tested a single hypothesis on either measure.
group,

In the Both Hypotheses

the average weight assigned to pro-hypothesis items was 2.17,

and the average value of anti-hypothesis items was -1.11 (on the
to +3 scale)

.

-3

Those who tested one of the two hypotheses assigned an

average value of 2.15 to items they judged as supportive of the hypothesis and an average value of -1.30 to items they considered as dis-

confirming of the hypothesis.

8

CHAPTER

VI

DISCUSSION

The goal of this investigation was to gain a better
understanding
of the way in which people answer questions about
others.

More specif-

ically, this study sought to determine if, and the
extent to which,
the question itself may predispose its answer.

By measuring both the

information retrieved from memory and the assessment of that
information,
an attempt was made to work back from the final judgment to trace
the

cognitive processes involved when individuals use information from
their own memory to test hypotheses about other people.

The explanation of intuitive hypothesis-testing derived from these

data is clouded by the unexpected differences between the Introvert and

Extravert hypotheses.

In principle, and by design,

there should have

been no differences between those who tested the Introvert hypothesis
and those who tested its alternative.

occurred at each stage of the process

Instead, significant discrepancies

— in

the type of information re-

called, in the assessment of that evidence, and in the final judgment
of job suitability.

The narrative contained equivalent amounts of

pro-introvert and pro-extravert evidence.

From an objective standpoint,

the story thus supported the two hypotheses equally.
to subjects who had both hypotheses before them,

balanced:

And, according

the narrative was

they recalled' equivalent amounts of introvert and extravert

items, they rated the pro-introvert and the pro-extravert evidence as

equivalently supportive of the two hypotheses, and, on the basis of the
narrative, they judged Jane to be equally suitable for both of the
75
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hypothesized occupations.

Other results from the Critical

Orientation-Single Hypothesis group suggest, however, that
the initial
appearance of the narrative's ambivalence may have been misleading.
Subjects in this group, the largest in the study, recalled more

introverted than extraverted items regardless of the hypothesis they

were testing.

Despite the fact that the introvert items were not more

numerous, they may have been more available in memory or more salient
after the two-day interval between their acquisition and their sub-

sequent use in hypothesis- testing

While this makes the interpretation of the findings less straightforward, it does not render the data uninf ormative of the cognitive

processes employed enroute to a judgment about

a

hypothesis.

Differences in processing due to the two different orientations can
still be detected, and other generalizations from the data can be

made if the two hypotheses are considered separately.
If it can then be best assumed that the recall data of those in the

Critical Orientation-Single Hypothesis group most accurately characterize

the distribution of introvert and extravert evidence actually

available to all subjects, it appears that the Uncritical Orientation
promotes the confirmatory error.
(a

Subjects given that orientation

replication of the instructions used by Snyder and Cantor) reported

as relevant more confirming than disconf irming evidence.

If they

were evaluating the introvert hypothesis' they listed as relevant
more evidence confirming that hypothesis.

On the other hand, if

they were evaluating Jane's suitability for the extravert occupation,
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they reported more evidence consistent
with that hypothesis, even

though more of its disconf irming data were
actually available.

These

findings replicate the pattern found by
Snyder and Cantor (1979)
using the same instructions to subjects.

If anything,

the data from

the present study show even more clearly the
effect of the hypotheses.

Even though the narrative apparently made more introvert
than extravert evidence available, subjects in the Uncritical
Orientation group

testing the extravert hypothesis listed as their evidence more
extravert than introvert items.
The difference between the Critical and Uncritical Orientations

shows the effect of different instructions or modes of gathering

evidence in hypothesis-testing.
a

When individuals, having been given

hypothesis, are asked only to review what they consider relevant

to that hypothesis,

there is a marked tendency to focus upon more

evidence that confirms the hypothesis and less that contradicts it.
On the other hand, when individuals are asked to make a more deliberate

and thorough review of all the evidence before making any decision

about the hypothesis, the confirmatory tendency is suppressed.

They

are not so influenced by the hypothesis that they recall more of its

confirming than disconf irming data.
The results obtained from the Uncritical Orientation group in this
study, as well as those found in Snyder and Cantor's experiment, are

consistent with findings obtained in related research.
1968,

Wason (1960,

1969) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) have shown that people

tend to test propositions by searching for instances, exemplars, or
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other evidence which would affirm their
truth (i.e., "positive hits"),
while ignoring (or at least making
much less effort to assemble)

evidence that would disprove them.

Recall, too, that Tversky and

Kahneman's (1974) representativeness
heuristic is based on the same
notion:

that intuitive questions are answered
by counting the amount

of supportive data.

This tendency, replicated as it has
been in

various judgmental tasks, seems to reflect a
fundamental feature of
intuitive reasoning.
The question which prompted this present investigation
was

why this tendency occurs.

Does the hypothesis itself influence the

organization of information held in memory such that the confirming
evidence is made easily accessible while disconf irming data is
masked
or made less retrievable?

The answer on the basis of the data

gathered here is a qualified no.

If the hypothesis operated as a

selective schematizing mechanism organizing only, or predominately,
its confirming instances, subjects in all groups, and especially those
in the Uncritical Orientation group, would have been expected to have

reported proportionately less disconf irming evidence.

The results

show that all participants were quite able to recall substantial

amounts of disconf irming evidence.
It therefore appears that the confirmatory error is not principally

due to the unavailability of disconf irming data.

9

Instead, it is

traceable to the way in which the question is construed and, more
accurately, to the standard used as the basis of comparison.

The data

support the view that subjects interpret Jane's job suitability to

.
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mean that she possesses the traits and behaviors
of the prototypic

salesperson or librarian.

The prototype, however, is defined

principally by traits and behaviors known or assumed
to be possessed
by the majority of members of those occupations.

That is, the proto-

type is defined mainly by confirming traits or behaviors.

Thus, when

subjects in the Uncritical Orientation group were asked to list what
they considered relevant, they reported the traits and behaviors Jane

shared with the prototype.

Since the prototype contained mostly

confirming exemplars, subjects reported more of Jane's confirming
characteristics.

This confirmatory error therefore seems to have as

its source the tendency to use a comparative standard which is incomplete

and one which does not sufficiently allow the falsification of the

hypothesis
The review article by Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) is pertinent
here.

Although they focus on the way in which antecedents and con-

sequents are learned, their discussion can be as well applied to the
way in which prototypes are developed and maintained.

Einhorn and

Hogarth suggest that confirming evidence is over-represented in memory
and is used as the test of intuitive hypotheses simply because in most

situations disconf irming evidence rarely ever becomes available.
Consider, for example, how individuals in this study learn about

"suitable" real estate salespersons.

Their conception comes from

successful salespeople they have known.

And those already in the

profession are, for the most part, suitable (if not, they would be
asked to seek employment in other fields).

The criterion against which

Jane is judged is therefore heavily weighted in terms of positive

.
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attributes
While the development of a confirmatory prototype may be a natural
and unavoidable consequence of

the way real life correlations are

learned, the tendency to use that prototype as the principal standard
of comparison can be avoided.

When, as those given the Critical

Orientation were, individuals are first asked to deliberately recall
all that they know about the person involved, and are then asked to

examine each bit of that evidence for its implications for the hypothesis,

the confirmatory error can be suppressed.

prompt individuals to be less reliant on

judgmental strategy.

a

These instructions

comparison-to-prototype

Instead of evaluating Jane against some cognitive

representation of confirming characteristics, subjects in the Critical
Orientation groups were able to attend to both the confirming and discontinuing attributes they had recalled from the narrative.

Additional findings from the Critical Orientation groups have
also shown how the hypothesis affects the interpretation of evidence

held in memory.

All subjects in these two groups interpreted most of

the evidence recalled to be supportive of the hypothesis.

Even those

who tested the extravert hypothesis and who recalled more introvert
than extravert items interpreted much more of those items as confirming
of the hypothesis.

The largest source of the difference between the

amount of evidence that objectively supported the hypothesis and the
amount subjects themselves viewed as confirmatory came from the

tendency to view ambiguous or irrelevant items as favorable.
of

Over half

between introversion
the items which normatively do not distinguish
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and extraversion came to be seen as consistent with the
hypothesis.
In hindsight, it appears that the magnitude of this kind
of mis-

interpretation of irrelevant evidence is overstated.
finding is due to the way in which items were defined.

Part of this
The classifica-

tion of evidence as introverted, extraverted, or irrelevant was taken

from a previous study by Cantor and Mischell (1977) and was also used
by Snyder and Cantor.

The classification system treats as equivalently

irrelevant items which do not at all refer to Jane's personality ("Jane
drove a small car") and items which may refer to her traits but which
are not identified with introversion or extraversion ("Jane was

punctual")

.

While items in the latter category may not distinguish

between introverts and extraverts, they can provide useful information
about Jane's potential job suitability.

Knowing that Jane was

punctual, for example, may not aid in determining whether she

is an

introvert or an extravert, but it can be helpful in assessing her

suitability for a job.

Thus, while some of the items recalled by

subjects were irrelevant to the intrcversion-extraversion dimension,
they were pertinent to a judgment about her job suitability.

In this

light, it is not surprising that so many "irrelevant" items were inter-

preted as relevant by subjects in this study.
Not all of the irrelevant items were useful in testing the

hypothesis.

Many were, from any point of view, quite void of

implications for Jane's occupational choice.

An examination of items

the
of this type showed that their interpretation was influenced by

hypothesis.

To take one example, many subjects remembered that Jane
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drove a small car (Datsun) to work.

A subject testing the introvert

hypothesis interpreted this as evidence that she was unflashy
and
reserved, typical introverted characteristics.

Another subject

considering Jane's suitability as a real estate salesperson commented
that her possession of an economical automobile would be a benefit in

that occupation since extensive driving could be expected.

As another

example, subjects often recalled that Jane intended to learn about
the taxation issues involved in the coming town election.

A subject

evaluating Jane's qualifications as a librarian mentioned that this
item of evidence indicated that Jane enjoyed and would be good at doing
research.

A counterpart testing Jane's suitability for the alternative

job interpreted this as a positive sign of Jane's interest in land

values and taxation rates.
The finding that ambiguous or ambivalent evidence is interpreted
in light of an hypothesis

investigations.

is consistent with results found in other

Ajzen, Dalto and Blyth (1979) found that irrelevant

information in the form of an ambiguous personality description came
to be viewed as consistent with a pre-existing impression.

The results

obtained here extend that finding to instances in which no prior

impression was formed.

Here, subjects were using information they

recalled to gain an impression and they tended to interpret the

ambiguous information as supportive of the hypothesis under consideration

.

The results of this study, summarized briefly, suggest that

comifirmatory errors were made by all subjects, but perhaps

at different

.
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stages in the hypothesis-testing process.

All those in the Uncritical

Orientation group reported as relevant more confirming than
disconfirming evidence and subjects in the Critical Orientation groups
tended to

interpret most of the evidence they recalled as supportive of the

hypothesis, even though, from an objective standpoint, much of that

evidence was uninf ormative about the hypothesis.

A comparison of the

results between the two orientation groups further suggests that one
source of the confirmatory error

mostly confirming data

— can

— the

tendency to assemble as evidence

be diminished by instructions which prompt

individuals to recall all that they know about the hypothesized person
and to carefully examine that evidence for its implications for the

hypothesis
This demonstration of unintentional flaws in intuitive judgmental

processes is in keeping with virtually all of the contemporary research
on the way in which people come to understand others and the world

about them.

With the possible exception of Ajzen (1977), all of the

published investigations of human reasoning reviewed in Chapters One
and Two or cited elsewhere in this paper have shown individuals to be
in error in the way they make inferences or judgments.

The impression

created by this body of literature is that the intuitive scientist is
all shortcomings and no strengths.

It is hard to imagine that any

individual who commits the kind of flaws noted in the literature as
frequently as he or she is said to commit them would go through

a

single day without causing serious harm to him/herself or others.
It

erroris even harder to imagine that a species comprised of such
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prone individuals would survive.

Since the species and most individuals

seem to be doing at least passably well, the impression created by the

literature must be misleading.

The research, including the present

study, has either succeeded in illuminating only trivial judgmental

errors, or its methods and procedures have promoted flawed judgments
to a degree that is atypical of ordinary circumstances.

be guilty of both.

This study may

The methodological artifacts which overstate the

magnitude of the confirmatory error have been described above.

But

the importance of the confirmatory error itself also deserves closer

scrutiny.

In this study, as in Snyder and Cantor's original experiment,

subjects made confirmatory errors in gathering evidence about Jane.
But neither in this study nor in Snyder and Cantor's were they mislead

by those errors to enthusiastically endorse Jane's job suitability.
In this study the average estimate of Jane's suitability for the real

estate job was just above the mid-point (X = 3.52) and the subjects'

assessment of her qualifications for the introverted occupation was at
the mid-point (X = 2.56).

Similarly, Snyder and Cantor did not find

their subjects to be very impressed with Jane's job potential even
data.
though they used as evidence more confirming than disconf irming

were about
On a one-to-six scale, the average job suitability judgments

mid-way between ill-suited and well-suited (X
job and 3.88 for its alternative).

= 3.86 for the introvert

The paradox that emerges then is

shown to be flawed,
that processes antecedent to a final judgment are
the normatively correct
but the final judgment itself is in line with

expectations.

Perhaps

a

to
new line of research should be devoted

how people succeed so
resolving this kind of paradox to illuminate

well in their intuitive reasoning while at the same time making
what appear to be pervasive errors in that reasoning process.

.

Footnotes
1

In most of the studies of subjective judgment,
subjects are asked

to estimate the likelihood or probability of any
outcome or multiple

outcomes.

Probabilistic dependent measures are used because they

allow the comparison of intuitive inferences against those
prescribed
by probability or statistical theory.

However, adherence to the dictates

of statistical principles has subtly become the standard of
"rationality"
in decision making.

It is not the best measure of the soundness of all

judgments
In statistics courses students estimate the probability of drawing
a red marble from an urn.

When they come to social psychology experi-

ments they may be asked to estimate the likelihood that any individual,
or the individual described in a brief character sketch, is an engineer
or a lawyer.

If they ever serve on a jury they are asked to decide if

the evidence points, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the defendant's

guilt.

In all these instances,

the judgment is one of probability.

However, these examples seem to imply different meanings of the term.
In one sense, and the one implied in judgments of the likelihood
of drawing a marble of a certain color from an urn, or of the

likelihood that any unspecified individual is an engineer, probability
refers to statistical regularity.

In this sense,

the probability of

an event is an expression of the relative frequency with which similar

events occur in the long run (cf. von Mises, 1951).

Probability here

refers to a collective of events, not to a particular member of that
collective.

To say that the probability of heads on the next toss is
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one half is to express some expectation about the set of
coin tosses
in an unlimited sequence of tosses, each of which is
independent.

says nothing about one particular coin toss.

It

Statistical probabilities

rest upon certain assumptions (independence and randomness) and are

calculated and combined according to specified arithmetic manipulations.
There is, however, another meaning of probability, one which refers
to individual events rather than to long run sequences of similar

events.

It can be argued,

furthermore, that most judgmental tasks,

whether posed in an experiment or suggested by everyday experience,
involve this alternative connotation of probability.

asked whether Jack is
a

a

When subjects are

lawyer or an engineer they are not asked about

collective of people like Jack, they are asked to make

a

decision

about one particular person.

The counter-argument is that this other meaning of probability is
not in any fundamental way a different kind of judgment.

This position

would hold that probabilities of specific events can and should be

regarded within the statistical framework.

This contention is

implicit in the research on intuitive reasoning.

By comparing the

probability of single events to that prescribed by statistical models,
researchers imply that idiographic probabilities should conform to
those describing nomothetic expectations.
This argument seems to have little support outside the social

sciences.

Von Mises (1951), for one, admits that the probability

probability
of single particular events is not a subject for the
ilculus.
ca^

Speaking for the community of classic probability
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statisticians, he writes, "The probability of death, when
a single person, has no meaning for us" (p.

11).

it refers to

Various other authors

seem to agree and incommensurate connotation of "probability."

Kneale (1949), probability meant justifiability.

For

In his interpretation,

to say that a conclusion or hypothesis was probable was to say that

the evidence justifies

("probabilif ies") the conclusion.

(1959) also takes probability to mean evidential support.

Popper
Similarly,

Carnap (1950) discusses probability in terms of degrees of confirmation of conclusions by information.

gradation of inferential support.

Cohen (1977) describes it as a

Despite differences in synonyms,

probability is, for all these writers, clearly relative to case-specific
judgments and clearly different from expectations about collectives of
similar events.

Rather than expressing an expectation about relative

frequencies in the long run, probability refers to an expectation
about a particular event at a particular time.

Historical regularities

in sequences of events may be included as part of the evidence upon

which

a

is made,

probabilistic (in this alternative sense of the word) estimate
but they are not the only or the best sources of evidence.

support
For some, even intuition was regarded as valid evidential

(Carnap,

1950; Keynes, 1921).

or
There seems to be substantial agreement that the classic

mathematicist interpretation of probability
for the meaning implied by its usage

is insufficient

in many cases.

to account

There is,

features of the
however, far less agreement about the defining

alternative interpretation.

Kneale (1949) argued that his concept
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of probabilif ication was not even a quantifiable concept and could not

in any meaningful way be incorporated into any formal calculus.

It

could be ordered in terms of the degree to which the evidence supported
the hypothesis, such that it is possible to distinguish instances
in which the conclusion is strongly supported from those in which it is

barely probabilif ied.

But there are also instances in which it is

difficult to determine whether or not, or to what degree,
is supported.

concept.

a

hypothesis

For Kneale, probability was a logical, not a metrical,

Keynes (1921) also embraced the notion of probability as

a

logical relation between evidence and a conclusion, but argued that

probabilistic relations could be represented in

a

formal mathematical

However, in the theory he proposed, probabilities of different

theory.

events were not comparable in magnitude.

So it was not possible to say

that the probability of one hypothesis based on some evidence was

greater or less than the probability of another hypothesis based on

different evidence.

Popper's probability-as-corroboration does not

obey the formal calculus of classic probability.

Carnap takes the term

of belief in a conclusion
to mean the measure of one's rational degree

or hypothesis.

precise
That degree of belief could be calculated as a

value between zero and one.

of
If held by rational people, degrees

("credence functions")
belief were said to obey certain function-rules
and the hypothesis.
describing the relationship between evidence

Carnap

's

is then a quantitative theory,

While

it is not the same as the

were, there would have been
statistical theory of probability (if it

making up a new one).
little need for him to spend his life

Carnap has,
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nonetheless, failed to convince his critics that the logical
concept
of probability can,

like the classic concept, be mapped onto a formal

calculus and calculated as a precise value.

Strawson (1952) argued

explicitly against a formal and quantitative expression of logical
probability:

"We can never describe the strength of evidence more

exactly than by the use of such words as 'slender',
'conclusive'.
is

.

."

(p.

247).

'good',

Similarly, Cohen's "inductive probability"

"rough, indeterminate, and a matter for judgment" (p. 40).

of being precisely quantifiable,

Instead

it allows only comparative or

ordinal gradations.
The point of this note is not to offer a resolution to the long-

standing difference of opinion about the quantif iability of logical
probability.

The purpose is to draw attention to the subjective

interpretation of probabilistic dependent measures.

This discussion

should suggest that probability, when it refers to picking a marble
out of an urn, may not mean the same thing, nor should it be calculated
in the same manner,

as the probability that Jack is an engineer.

In

many cases, an individual's estimate of probability represents his or
her belief in the (psycho) logical inferability of the hypothesis,

given the evidence.

It does not refer to their computations of empir-

ical frequencies according to a formal calculus.

.

.
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D is the cause of C if it is not a spurious cause,

i.e.,

if no

event antecedent to D accounts for the conditional probability of the
effect just as completely.
a

D is a spurious cause of C if there exists

prior event A such that:

p

See Chapter

C

{

8

/

D

&

A

=

}

p{

C

/

A}

of Wason and Johnson-Laird for a discussion of some

differences between logical material implication and psychological
implication

A

The distinction here between errors and biases is somewhat differ-

ent from that of Kruglanski and Aj zen

.

Here, errors are cognitive in

origin and biases are motivational.

I

would like to thank Dr. Mark Snyder for making his stimulus

materials available to me.

6

Snyder and Cantor (1979) had the independent judges divide the

recalled evidence into only two categories

— introvert

and extravert.

Since the narrative used in this study was modified to include neutral
or irrelevant descriptors,

the independent judges included the

irrelevant category as one of the classifications.

Ambivalent items

introvert
are those listed by subjects which make reference to both

when jogging
and extravert characteristics (e.g., "Jane was outgoing
but shy at the office")
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Analyses involving the subjects who tested both hypotheses
were
conducted by following the procedure outlined by Erlebacher
(1977).
In that paper Erlebacher describes a technique for deriving
the

appropriate sums of squares, mean squares, degrees of freedom, and
quasi-F ratios for an analysis of variance that includes the design
type as a factor in the analysis.

Design type refers to the distinction

between a Within-subject and a Between-subject manipulation.
Erlebacher'

s

procedure is well-suited for this design in which the

subjects who tested one of the two alternative hypotheses (Betweensubject manipulation) were measured against those who tested both of
the hypotheses (Within-subject manipulation).
Dr.

Jerry Myers for recommending Erlebacher'

s

I

would like to thank

article and for patiently

explaining the generalization of that procedure to multi-factor designs.

g

The effect of

a

hypothesis on the type of information recalled

from memory and on the interpretation of that information may be

strongest on the initial items of evidence recalled.

This assumption

is based on the view that the first items may be more spontaneously

retrieved while latter items may be the product of a more deliberate

memory search and their retrieval may therefore be less dependent
upon the influence of the hypothesis.

To examine this possibility,

separate analyses of each of the dependent measures described here
were conducted comparing the first five items recalled against all

other items.

No differences were found on any measure.

This is not to deny that cognitive sets induced prior to the

acquisition of knowledge do not operate as organizing schemas for
subsequent information stored in memory.

A considerable amount of

recent research has shown that pre-existing trait dimensions (Cantor
&

Mischell, 1977), self concepts (Markus, 1977), and attitudes (Judd

& Kulik,

1980) can direct the way in which relevant knowledge is

organized in memory.

The "induced set" research essentially deals

with the influence of prior expectations or wishes on processes used
to encode later information.

with the effect of a

In contrast,

the present study deals

hypothesis on previously encoded information.
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.

Instructions

In this study we are interested in people's
ability to remember

the factual details of a story that describes a week
in the life of

another person.

There has recently been a great deal of concern with

people's ability to notice factual details and to remember these
details when they observe or hear about real-life events.

Although

people seem to be quite good at recalling the gist of a story, there
is

less support for their ability to remember the factual details of

one.

The ability to remember factual details can be quite important

in certain aspects of our lives.

For instance, eyewitness testimony

in a court trial depends on the ability to remember often small

details of a visual scene or another person's physical appearance.
In our study you will read a story about a week in the life of an

actual person

— Jane.

The names and places have been changed in order

to conceal this person's real identity.

We would like you to simply

read the story and concentrate as you read on the factual details

about people, places, and events in the story.

Consider that you are

reading a story in order to be able to tell someone else about the
details contained in that story.

After you read the story, we will

ask you to tell us about some of the details from the story.

You will have

7

minutes to read the story.

It

is 4 pages long

so you should have plenty of time to read it through at a comfortable

pace

103

104

At 7:15 on Monday morning Jane woke up, turned
off the alarm

clock, and crawled out of bed.

She dressed quickly in a tweed skirt

and red blouse, ate her usual cornflakes breakfast, and
got ready to
leave.

This morning Jane had a doctor's appointment before
work.

The

mist had gathered on her new Datsun and she stopped just long
enough
to clean the windshield before starting off.

drove slowly in the downtown traffic.

Jane was cautious and

She pulled up to the large

Jackson building on Hyde Street in time to find a parking spot.

In

the elevator on the way up to the doctor's office, Jane kept aloof

from the other passengers and didn't join in the joking about how
the elevators in these old buildings take forever.

She got off, along

with six other people, at the 5th floor.
Jane greeted the doctor's nurse with a smile.

While waiting for

the doctor she had a conversation with another patient about running

and other sports.

Finally, the doctor was able to see her.

Jane

had a quick check-up, consisting of a blood sample, an eye test, and
an EKG.

check-up.

She seemed to be in perfect health and left quickly after the

Doctor's offices always seemed to run behind schedule.

Jane arrived at work a little late since her appointment took
longer than she expected.

Nevertheless, Jane was both efficient and

productive and managed to get several important tasks done before the

morning coffee break.

The people in Jane's office took their 20

minute coffee break together and spent most of the time talking about
their weekends.

Jane didn't seem to want to take part in this social
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activity.

She remained reserved and discrete about her personal
life.

When one of the men asked her for

a date,

and seemed to be self-conscious.

Everyone around the office was

talking about the high price of coffee.

Jane looked to the ground

It was much too expensive

and everyone was trying to find an alternative drink.

Tea seemed

almost as expensive and didn't quite take the place of a good cup of

After a brief discussion, everyone went back to work.

coffee.

The rest of the day was fairly hectic
be.

— as

most Mondays tend to

Jane's job often required close cooperation with other people,

which meant that she had to be patient and courteous, but at the same
time, deliberate and effective.

Jane was known as a very able worker

who had the right blend of interpersonal skills and task dedication.
After work, Jane got ready to do her hour's worth of running for
She started down Humboldt street near her house, turned

the day.

right at James Street, and then ran through the whole Brentwood
district.

Most of the streets around her house were beautifully lined

with trees and had relatively traffic-free paths for running.
would run vigorously for at least an hour a day.

Jane

She kept a busy

schedule, going from activity to activity, and gave the impression
of having unlimited energy.

Somehow she managed to remain friendly

and outgoing despite her long day at work.

Jane loved to run and

seemed enthusiastic and. cheerful even when the weather wasn't exactly
ideal.

Today she was running with a neighbor named Mary Stuart and

talk—cracking
the two of them spend the entire time in spirited
endurance.
jokes and boasting about their running skills and

During
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her run, Jane came across people she didn't know but said hello to

each of them anyhow.
but not today.

Sometimes she was uncomfortable with strangers,

She surprised herself in how forcefully she exercised

after such a long day at work.

Sports had lately become a fad in her

neighborhood and it was amazing to see the streets lined with joggers
at the end of the day.

booming business

— everybody

fancy new sweatpants.
shoes.

The sportswear industry was certainly doing a
had on their new pair of Adidas and their

Jane was saving up to buy a new pair of running

She had always been pretty thrifty and had little trouble

saving for something she really wanted.
Two days later, Jane went to the local Safeway supermarket to do
her weekly shopping.

price of food.

She walked down the aisles, amazed at the high

Even the price of soap had gone up in the last week.

As a rule, Jane tried to remain unnoticed at the market and avoided

interaction with other shoppers from her neighborhood.
and shy, buying her food and waiting patiently in line.
the checkout clerk,

She was timid

Today, Ethel,

tried to engage Jane in conversation, but Jane

remained bashful and hesitant.

The big supermarkets were certainly a

from just
lot different than the typical local stores Jane remembered

five years ago.

They now had complicated labelling and computerized

check-out systems.

As far as Jane was concerned, the move to modern

supermarkets was a step backwards.

Not only did one have to pay

had to put up
outrageous prices for the food these days, but also

with the noise and crowds.
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Jane took classes at Redding College three nights a week.
adult education program in the area was superbly run.

The

One of her

classes was Communications and the students were practicing debating
skills.

This was particularly appropriate for Jane since she was

about to run for a position in the local government and would be

exchanging views with several other candidates.

Jane was always

tolerant of other people's views, and treated everyone with courtesy,
but she was also serious about her own point of view.

The local

politicians considered that Jane had a good chance of winning in her
campaign.

She was ambitious and seemed to be confident in her opinions.

They also recognized, however, that she was new to politics and hadn't

developed many of the more practical skills.
to be a little too soft-spoken.

local races would turn out.

She tended,

It was never really clear how these

The public got fairly involved in local

politics and were genuinely interested in the issues.
of the country,

for example,

As in most areas

the current problem was how to get enough money for

local programs without taxing the citizens beyond their ability to
pay.

The taxes in this area had gone up 15% in the last two years.

Jane didn't know a great deal about taxation and municipal finances,
but she had reasonably good mathematical skills and figured she could

learn about the issues quickly.

Jane's college course schedule was heavy this semester
night classes.

— three

She was generally quite anxious over her work.

In

most of her classes she felt somewhat inhibited and tried to think
through

a

question before she dared ask it.

Professor Osborne assigned
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a

lot of reading in her Literature class, but
Jane did not mind

spending hours alone in the library.

It had recently been remodeled

and the booths for studying were comfortable and
quiet.

The only

problem was that the booths in the back part of most rooms
were too
warm.

Jane had meant to complain to the staff about this, but
never

got around to actually making the complaint.

That weekend, Jane went to McAllister park and sat and daydreamed
for hours.

Although the park was full of people, Jane appeared deep

in thought and withdrawn from the activity around her.

little sad and spent most of the day by herself.

She felt a

Later that evening

she went to a pot-luck party at a neighbor's house.

Jane had cooked

enough chili to feed practically the whole neighborhood.

Since every-

one brought something different to eat, the dinner was a lot of fun.

After dinner they put on some records and Jane danced for much of the
rest of the evening.

The party went on for quite a while and late that

night they all pitched in to help clean up.

It was certainly an

improvement in the spirit of the neighborhood and everyone discussed
what a difference these get-togethers had made in the atmosphere on
the block.

The only way to make a city liveable was to keep the

neighborhoods beautiful and the people in close contact.
The next morning the alarm clock went off as usual at 7:15.

turned over in a groggy state of half-sleep, realized
and cursed the alarm clock.

it

Jane

was Sunday,

She curled up to try to recover that

pleasant state of drowsy unconsciousness, but she was no better than
most people at falling back to sleep, so she got out of bed and went
to make a pot of coffee.

Appendix B

Test of Factual Knowledge
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What kind of car did Jane own?

What street was the Jackson Building on?

On what floor was the doctor's office?

How long was the coffee break where Jane worked?
What was Jane saving her money for?

What supermarket did Jane shop at?

What was the name of the college Jane attended?

How many courses did she take during the semester?

What was the percent increase in local taxes?

What was the name of Jane's neighborhood?

